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I. INTRODucrioN
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY was signed in Rio de

Janeiro in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED).' The ambitious goal of the treaty is to stem the
world-wide loss of biodiversity. The treaty also has another purpose, one
intertwined with the primary goal: The Convention is, in part, an attempt
to establish an international legal regime governing the use of and access
to plant genetic resources. This issue has been the subject of acrimonious
debate between Southern developing countries, "the source of most
genetic resources, and Northern industrial countries, "those countries
currently in the best position to reap financial gains from genetic resource
use." This Article traces the historical background for this issue, including
human uses of plant genetic resources, prior international and U.S. laws
on the subject, conservation efforts to date, and the role played by biotechnology. Particular attention is paid to the Convention's relationship to
the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, a 1983 U.N.
Food and Agriculture Conference Resolution that served as the first major
international attempt to define the legal status of plant genetic resources.'
The Article examines the approaches taken by each document, and
illustrates how the Convention seeks to promote its conservation goals by
making genetic resources profitable to the developing countries that
harbor them. Finally, the Article charts how the Convention has shaped
international activity since UNCED.
II. THE ROLE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN HUMAN EXISTENCE
A. The Cause for Concern
In recent years, prominent scientists such as E.O. Wilson have
alerted humankind to the value of biodiversity and the folly of instigating
its current precipitous decline While Dr. Wilson points to the more
general role diversity plays in supporting the web of life, two aspects of

Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
818 (1993) (entered into force December 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention].
2 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, at 22, U.N. Doc. c/83/REP
(1983) [hereinafter International Undertaking].
' See generally BioDivErsrrY (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988).

376

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 30:373

plant diversity are of specific concern to humankind: its role in agriculture and its role in medicine.
Human agriculture involves the screening and manipulation of plants'
genetic components. The larger the pool of genetic resources, the greater
the options farmers have to meet changing conditions. In the medical arena, humans have long drawn upon the properties of various plants to deal
with illnesses. Such use probably pre-dates human civilization by a wide
margin. Though recently humans have manufactured many synthetic
medicines, the chemical blueprints for such pharmaceutics were in many
cases first discovered in natural plant materials before they were reproduced in the laboratory.4
Today, biotechnology is helping both farmers and medical researchers
sift through the available genetic options to produce more precisely
tailored crops and drugs.5 As these genetically manipulated items begin
to take on the nature of human invention rather than of nature itself,
there has been an increasing push within the biotechnology industry to
protect the innovations under the mantle of intellectual property rights
regimes.6 The general effect of intellectual property protection is to give
the rights holders greater control over access and use of the protected
materials.
These technological advances are occurring as the actual pool of
plant genetic resources (PGR) shrinks. Many countries in which
biodiversity is the richest are eager to develop rapidly to catch up with
the standard of living enjoyed by the developed world and to keep up
with an exploding human population. Often this development comes at
the direct expense of the richest biodiversity centers. An additional blow
to genetic diversity has come from within the agricultural industry. Even
as large parcels of land remain in farmland, the genetically diverse

' The most common example is acetylsalicylic acid, the active ingredient in aspirin.
This chemical is derived from salicylic acid, a natural pain reliever found in willow
bark. See Oliver Phillips & Brien Meilleur, Survey by CPC Reveals "Extraordinary"
Contributions of Wild Plants to U.S. Economy, DIvERsTY, vol. 11, no. 3 (1995), at 10,
11.
See Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Dinner?, 28 TULSA LJ. 587, 589 (1993).
6 The American Seed Trade Association (ASTA) Board of Directors adopted the
ASTA Position Statement on Intellectual Property Rights for the Seed Industry on June
29, 1990. This position statement called for more expansive intellectual property rights
for genetic materials. See ASTA Takes Step to Protect Intellectual Property Rights, DIVERsrry, vol. 6, nos. 3 & 4 (1990), at 53. Members of the ASTA include plant breeders, seed companies, and biotechnology firms. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 596 n.33.
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traditional crops called land races7 are being replaced with high-yielding
but genetically narrow elite cultivars.
Though developing countries serve as suppliers of the raw materials
for these biotechnological advances, they have seldom shared in the
profits. In fact, they sometimes purchase "from interests in the developed
world" these elite cultivars and medicines derived from the materials they
supplied without charge.' In recent years, many developing countries have
threatened to restrict access to their genetic resources unless some form
of profit-sharing is instituted.
The protests of genetic source countries highlight an issue still
unresolved by the international community: How much are PGR, as
individual genes, really worth? Although there is general agreement about
the benefits of maintaining a diverse gene pool, the argument that some
value or claim of ownership could attach to a particular handful of PGR
(usually in the form of seeds) has been rejected until recently at the level
of the international legal regime.
Previous declarations, most recently the International Undertaking,
had instead proclaimed PGR to be the "heritage of manldnd." This
stance was felt to promote free and open access to PGR, for the benefit
of all. In the view of source countries, however, it has allowed developed
countries to appropriate PGR to produce agricultural and pharmaceutical
products for their own use and profit. This appropriation was not considered particularly egregious by the developed world, which pointed out
that much of the benefits (if not the initial profits) flowed back to the
developing world in the form of better crops and lifesaving medicines."
Today, questions arise over whether this flow back has been entirely
beneficial. Additional questions surface as to whether the flow will

" Jack R. Kloppenburg explains land races as follows:
Land races are genetically variable populations that exhibit different responses to pests,
diseases, and fluctuations in environmental conditions .... The genetic diversity of
these land races was, and remains, a form of insurance for peasant cultivators. By
planting polycultures comprising genetically diverse varieties, peasant farmers made
certain that, whatever the year might bring in the way of weather or pests, some of the
seed sown would grow to maturity and provide a crop. The objective of these early
breeders was not high yield but consistency of production. And the result of their
efforts was the development of great inter- and intra-specific genetic variability in
particular and relatively confined geographic regions.
JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, FIRST THE SEED 46 (1988).
See id.at 171.
9 International Undertaking, supra note 2.
10 See Rebecca L. Margulies, Protecting Biodiversity; Recognizing International
Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 322, 34749 (1993).
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continue in either direction unless more financial benefits flow back into
the source countries. The Biodiversity Convention recognizes source
country control over its genetic resources," and thereby recognizes the
right to demand compensation for such resources. The Biodiversity
Convention, however, does not attempt to determine the amount and form
of compensation. 2
B. The Evolution of Plant Genetic Diversity
Within the chromosomes of a plant are found the genes that determine the characteristics the plant will display in life. Each plant has a
genetic code, its own allotment of genetic material from its species' pool
of genes. In the wild, the evolutionary process shapes the pool and selects
the genes for inclusion. The passage of genes into the next generation is
a function of the plant's ability to successfully reproduce. Though this
process involves complexities and interrelationships well beyond human
understanding, the fundamental concept is simple: survival of the fittest.
Those genes that increase the plant's fitness to its environment, or more
precisely, the plant's reproductive fitness, will have a higher probability
of flowing into subsequent generations. As would be expected, those that
decrease reproductive fitness will experience a higher attrition rate and
will be less likely to reappear.
This is not a single path process in which a discrete set of "best"
genes eventually win out and occupy the entire gene pool. Conditions
change over space and time, and genetic combinations change with them.
One genetic code may facilitate a plant's growth in hot, dry conditions,
while another may adapt a plant of the same species to tolerate cooler
and wetter conditions. Which combination is best (i.e., which increases
the ability to survive and reproduce) depends upon the conditions in
which the plant finds itself.
Changes in gene structure, leading to greater amounts of diversity,
are sometimes facilitated through genetic mutations. These mutations most
often hurt the plants survivability, leading to a pre-reproductive death. 3
Sometimes, however, these mutations can lend the plant some competitive

" "Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments
and is subject to national legislation." Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(1)
(emphasis added).
2 Various methods to provide compensation are discussed infra.
13 See KINGSLEY R. STERN, INTRODUCTORY PLANT BIOLoGY 215 (1994).
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advantage. 4 If so, the number of these new genes will begin to expand
within the genetic pool.
In sum, gene selection is a dynamic process. As ecosystem conditions shift across time and space, genetic combinations must shift as well.
The ebb and flow of success versus failure within a given gene pool is
directly dependent upon competition from within the species and from
other species, consisting of other gene pools. A tremendous amount of
diversity results, both in the number of species and the genetic variability
within individual species.
C. Agriculture as a Function of Genetic Diversity
Human agriculture has existed for some ten thousand years.'5
Throughout all but the past few decades of the ten millennia humans
have farmed plants, however, we have had no actual knowledge of the
microscopic gene that drives the process. Nevertheless, through selective
breeding we have attempted to harness these unseen forces and channel
the plants' genetic interactions to produce food.
Though genes themselves remained unseen and even unimagined
until the late nineteenth century, 6 the human race has counted upon the
pool of plant genetic diversity to sponsor the proliferation and spreading
of our own species. Early farmers saved and planted the seeds of desired
food crops. Preferred foods that survived better were maintained, those
that showed poorer performance were abandoned. Agriculture, in a sense,
is the redirection of plant genes to coincide with human desires. As in
nature, undesirable traits are filtered out while desirable traits are encouraged.
In one sense, however, the "free market" of nature no longer applies
to agricultural crops. Rather than survival of the fittest under the unfettered competition of nature, agricultural genes are subsidized. They pass
into the next generation under the partial direction of human efforts. In
some instances, genes that are already indicators of reproductive success
are given an extra boost. In other cases, genes that might otherwise have
decreased reproductive fitness and normally would have drifted toward

14

See id.

,5 See THE

KEYSTONE CENTER, KEYSTONE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE SERIES ON
PLANT GENETIC RESoURcES, OSLO PLENARY SESSION, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT.

GLOBAL INrnATWvE FOR THE SECURrrY AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF PLANT GENETIC

RESOURCES 3 (1991) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT].
6 The science of genetics was pioneered by the Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel.
See STERN, supra note 13, at 192-98.
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extinction, (but which produce some characteristic palatable to humans),
are offered a ladder into the next generation.17
As human selective processes sometimes diverge from natural
selective processes, the altered plants might lose their ability to compete
in the wild. Many agricultural crops are completely dependent upon
human protection and cultivation. They grow only if sown in season by
humans, are watered under controlled conditions, are provided the necessary nutrients, and are protected from predation and competition. 8
In imitation of nature, however, plant breeders have attempted to
maintain access to a wide range of genetic variability to develop heartier
strains and meet changing conditions. 9 Agricultural strategies involve
maintaining a diversity of genetic possibilities coupled with the diversity
of environmental possibilities. Thus, the genetic variability of crop species
developed in response to human variations. As crops species were carried
along with human migrations, different characteristics were preserved to
suit changing climactic and soil conditions, as well as changing tastes."
But even when humans stayed immobile, farmers generally did not
save only the seeds that worked best for that one location and one time
period.2' Even in discrete settled areas, environmental conditions fluctuate season to season and over the long term. Farmers had to retain the
resources to adapt to such changes.
The threat posed by herbivorous insects is representative of the many
reasons why farmers must remain flexible and maintain diversity. Insects
generally breed rapidly, producing large numbers of offspring in a
relatively short time. Under such conditions, insect gene flow is rapid and
constructive genes quickly gain ascendance in the pool. Though casualties
may be high, adaptations to prey defenses can develop and spread

quickly. =

The plant species preyed upon by insects respond in kind by producing more offspring resistant to the threat.' In the wild, these adaptive
shiftings of genes within the respective gene pools happen in concert, a
sort of genetic dance between predator and prey. The same sort of give
17 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note

7, at 2.

"S See H. Garrison Wilkes, Plant Genetic Resources Over Ten Thousand Years:
From a Handful of Seed to the Crop-Specific Mega-Gene Banks, in SEEDS AND SOvEREGNTY, THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC REsouRCEs

Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
"9See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
20 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 46.
2 See id.
2 See DAVm A. PERRY, FOREST ECOSYSTEMS 439-42 (1994).
2 See id. at 453-59.

67 (Jack R.
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and take occurs between plants and other stressors such as fungal pathogens and plant competitors.'
With cultivars, however, the farmer often must enter the fray and
determine on behalf of the plant which defenses to bring forward against
the assault. Success hinges on luck, the skill of the farmer, and the
flexibility of the resources in the form of multiple genetic varieties.
Because of this, a high degree of diversity has been maintained even as
the crop gene pools have branched off from those of their wild relatives z Diversity, therefore, has served as the traditional weapon available to farmers to ensure the stability of their crops.'
The efforts of early farmers in redirecting the gene pool, combating
predators, and selecting for other environmental conditions produced for
us the land races.' These traditional cultivars serve as the foundation of
our food crops today. The actual number of plant species "chosen" by
humans over the course of our agricultural history has been quite small.
Only about 5,000 plant species, a fraction of a percent of the world's
total flora, feed the human population. Fewer than twenty plant species
are responsible for ninety percent of the world's food supply,29 and a
mere three species cover sixty percent of the total supply2°
D. The Twentieth Century: Severing the Connection Between Agricultural
Success and Diversity
Though technological advances over the course of human development have altered many agricultural processes, the selection by farmers of
seeds from the previous years' harvests remained a fundamental aspect of
farming into the early twentieth century.3 1 By way of illustration, the
following anecdote is taken from a National Geographic article on
sustainable agriculture. The author recounts a story of his family farm,
and the farming methods employed by his grandfather in the 1930s:
24 See Otto H. Frankel, Landraces in Transit-The Threat Perceived, DmvmRSrrY, vol.

11, no. 3 (1995), at 14 [hereinafter Frankel, Landraces].
25 See id.
' See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 46.

' See id. Landraces are "dynamic natural laboratories in which host-pathogen coevolutionary interactions are played out far into the future." Frankel, Landraces, supra

note 24, at 15.
' See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 68.
'9 See Howard G. Buffett, The Partnership of Biodiversity and High-Yield Agricultural Production, DrvEasrrY, vol. 12, no. 1, at 16 (1996).
o See Boyce Rensberger, Nurturing a Cornucopia of Potential; Project Aims to
Revive Ancient Food Sources, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
" Verlyn Klinkenborg, A Farming Revolution, NAT'L GEO., Dec. 1995, at 66.
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In the fall the wagons came back full from the cornfields, and as the
corn was being put into cribs, my grandfather watched for ears that
looked especially full and large. These he tossed into bushel baskets,
which were carried to the basement of the farmhouse. There, in the
furnace room, it was my father's job to sort the corn onto wire grids 24
ears across.
From each ear of com my grandfather took three or four kernels and
placed them on an incubator tray-the position of the seeds on each tray
matching the position on the wire grid of the ear from which they
came. Then he dampened the kernels and waited. The ears whose kernels didn't sprout were fed to the hogs and chickens. The ears whose
kernels showed good germination were set aside, shelled, and used as
the next year's seeds.32
This story, however, represents a form of agriculture that would
experience a rapid decline over the next few decades. The late twentieth
century has brought about a radical departure from the agricultural
methods that had existed for millennia. An example of the agriculture that
was to come is found in the continuation of the same National Geographic story. The author recounts the story of the same farm after the passage
of thirty years:
By the 1950s and early 1960s, when I first began visiting that farm, the
corn they were using had changed. The seeds no longer came from last
year's crop; by then it was patented hybrid corn. It came in pallets full
of 80,000 seed bags from national seed companies. It was purchased
anew every year, because every year there was a new improvement and
because hybrid corn will not develop properly from the planting of a
previous year's kernels. Given enough chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and
machine power, hybrid varieties of corn now result in yields my
grandfather would have thought impossible in the 1930s, 180, 200
bushels an acre, three or four times the yields he was getting in the
good years. But to get these yields, farming had to change almost
beyond recognition. It came to rely less on the skills of farmers and
more on a chemical arsenal to suppress weeds and insects and to
replace the diminishing fertility of the soil.3

32

Id. at 66.

33 Id.
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E. The Origins of the Change
What prompted such a rapid alteration in farming technique? Three
events stand out as the primary catalysts. The roots of the revolution
probably began with the work of Gregor Mendel, an Austrian monk and
botanist in the late 1800s.' His simple breeding experiments with garden
peas gave us a better understanding of how traits are passed from one
generation to the next?' They laid the foundation for the modem science
of genetics, and led agricultural scientists toward the development of
hybridization methods in the early twentieth century. The second event
was the work of Russian geneticist Nikolai Vavilov, who theorized in the
1920s that there were discrete agricultural "centers of origin," or geographic regions from which our cultivated species evolved. Vavilov
pointed plant breeders toward a source of genetic materials with which to
bolster the gene pool of modem cultivars, and pioneered the development
of national and international gene banks.36 The third event, actually two
separate breakthroughs, were the discoveries in the 1960s that certain
dwarfing wheat and rice genes could be inserted into modem cultivars to
greatly improve crop yields.' These discoveries spawned the "Green
Revolution" and a dramatic increase in world food production. A fourth
event, still taking shape, is the role of biotechnology and its promise of
more precise gene manipulation.38
1. Gregor Mendel
The study of genetics usually starts with the story of Gregor Mendel
and his 1865 experiments with two strains of garden peas.39 Bred separately for generations, one of Mendel's varieties produced offspring with
smooth peas, the other produced wrinkled peas. When Mendel tried
crossing the two strains, it always resulted in smooth offspring. At that
point, Mendel pondered whether the "wrinkledness" trait had simply
disappeared, obliterated by the "smoothness" trait. He received his answer

3

See STERN, supra note 13, at 192-98.
See id.

' Vavilov's work reconnected us with our agricultural past by revealing the possible
geographic origins of modem crop varieties. Ironically, his work also served as a
catalyst for a breeding industry that would effectively sever our ties to this past, and
to fanning methods that had evolved over the previous 10,000 years of agriculture.
3 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2-3.
3' See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 589.
3 See STERN, supra note 13, at 192.
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when he crossed a smooth offspring back with a wrinkled parent. This
time, half the offspring were smooth, half wrinkled.
Intrigued, Mendel carried the experiment further. In the next round
of experiments, he crossed two smooth siblings that were offspring of a
smooth/wrinkled pairing. This time, three quarters of the offspring were
smooth, but one quarter turned up wrinkled. The "wrinkledness" trait had
skipped a generation and had shown up again in the second generation
removed from the wrinkled ancestor.'
These simple experiments had profound implications. It showed that
these plants carried some hidden code, a code that did not necessarily
manifest itself in the plants' outward physical appearance. These hidden
codes could be passed on to subsequent generations and reappear to
produce a plant that did not resemble either of its immediate parents (as
in the one-in-four wrinkled offspring from a pair of smooth parents).
Though Mendel did not use the term "gene" for these codes, his work
was among the first experimental evidence of the presence of genes.4
Mendel's experiments did not gain wide attention initially. Ignored
for over three decades, they were rediscovered around 1900.42 William
Bateson, the "father" of the science of genetics, used Mendel's work as
a basis for his own studies. 43
2. Nikolai Vavilov
In the 1920s, Nikolai Vavilov, a Russian geneticist who had studied
with Bateson in London, was placed in charge of the Soviet Union's
Institute of Plant Industry in Leningrad where he initiated a plant breeding research program based on genetics.' Vavilov believed that plant
breeders should look for "fresh" genetic materials to revive the vigor of
cultivated varieties.4' Vavilov theorized that this fresh material was
available in the more primitive land races and wild relatives of modem
cultivars. He felt that the genes of these wilder species could provide
some of the environmental tolerance lacking in the cultivated varieties.'

4

41

See id. at 194.

See id. at 192.

42

See id.

4'

See

CALEsTOUS JuMA, THE GENE HUNTERs

33 n.4 (1989). Bateson must have

taken his title as "father of genetics" seriously. He named his son "Gregory" after
Gregor Mendel. See id.
4 See John Reader, The Rights and Wrongs of Vavilov, GUARDIAN, July 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
' See id.
4 See id.
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In an effort to acquire greater access to these potentially useful
genetic materials, Vavilov called for a global inventory of both cultivated
plants and their wild relatives. With initial backing from Lenin, Vavilov
sent hunting expeditions to all parts of the Soviet Union and to sixty
other nations4 In some cases the results were immediate. An expedition
to the Andes brought back twelve new potato species, to supplement the
one species previously known.'8
Due to Vavilov's efforts, the Soviet Union would lead the way in
the development of agricultural research institutions. Vavilov established
a network of 400 research and experimental stations throughout the Soviet
Union, maintaining links with related centers in other parts of the
world.49 At one point, he had amassed 25,000 wheat varieties."
In connection with this work, Vavilov identified eight regions of the
earth (he later expanded the number to twelve) that showed a high degree
of diversity in connection with the major crop species."1 Vavilov theorized that these centers of diversity were in fact the "centers of origin"
for the world's food crops.52 According to Vavilov, almost all the major
food crops originated within these (subsequently named) "Vavilov Centers."53 For the most part, these centers are located in developing countries, and in total consist of less than a quarter of the earth's arable
land.5' Though the direct connection between centers of "diversity" and
centers of "origin" has subsequently been called into question, the discovery of the Vavilov Centers still provide an important source of fresh
genetic material to revive modem cultivars.55
3. Hybridization
Vavilov became the major pioneer in the movement to collect and
analyze untapped genetic resources. Even prior to Vavilov, however, the

'
48

See id.

See id.
id.

49 See

0 See id.
s,See id.

52 See JUMA, supra note 43, at 16.

53See id.

See The Vanishing Seeds, 6 ENvTL. POL'Y & L. 163 (1980).

See Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy: National Property Versus Common Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOvEREIGNTY: THE USE AND
CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIc REsouRcEs, 173, 177 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed.
55

1988) [hereinafter Kloppenburg & Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy]; see also
KLOPPENBURG,

supra note 7, at 175.
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new field of genetics had led to more controlled plant breeding efforts.'
The rudimentary understanding of gene function beginning with the turn
of the twentieth century allowed breeders to reduce the amount of time
and materials used in breeding experiments.57 Attempts to improve the
vigor of agricultural plants, therefore, became more focused and more
successful.58
Within the first two decades of the twentieth century, this focus led
to a breakthrough method of breeding corn: hybridization.59 Under natural conditions, inbreeding in plants such as corn leads to reduced vigor.'
However, when two separate inbred lines are crossed, the offspring from
the cross
experience an immediate recovery of vigor (known as "hetero61
sis").

Since hybridization promised higher-yielding varieties, research
efforts and government finance in the United States for research began to
concentrate on the production of hybrid seeds.62 Other research efforts
were virtually abandoned.63 The hybrid techniques received wide publicity as a revolutionary new process. As a sign of what was to come, in the
mid-1920s Pioneer, Inc. (later, Pioneer Hi-Bred) became the first private
hybrid seed company in the United States."
It was not until after the Great Depression that this new technology
really took hold.' When it did, the change was dramatic. In less than a
decade, from 1937 to 1945, hybrid corn seed use in the United States
increased from thirteen percent to eighty-eight percent.' By the 1950s,
over ninety-five percent of the American Corn Belt was planted with
hybrid varieties.67
As mentioned in the National Geographic anecdote, the use of
hybrids involved purchasing seeds from a seed company each year rather

See JUMA, supra note 43, at 80.
See id.
5' See id.
59 See Norman E. Borlaug, Contributions of Conventional Plant Breeding to Food
Production, 219 SCIENCE 689 (1983).
' See id.
61 See id; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 98.
62 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 92-94.
63 See id.
56

6

See id.

65 See id.

See Jean-Pierre Berlan & R.C. Lewontin, The Political Economy of Hybrid Corn,
REV., July 1986, at 35.
67 See H. Garrison Wilkes & Susan Wilkes, The Green Revolution, ENVIRONMENT,
vol. 14, no. 8 (1972), at 33.
6
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than replanting seeds the farmer had saved from the previous year. In
general, replanting hybrids results in a precipitous decline in yield,
whereas the purchase of "new" seeds and "new" varieties keeps production high.' Farmers, of course, were willing to purchase the seeds anew
as long as they believed the extra income from the higher-yield hybrid
exceeded the extra cost of the seeds.O
The switch to hybrids meant both a change in farmer preferences and
a fundamental transformation of the agricultural industry. With the switch
to hybrids, seeds became a commodity7 The incentive for seed improvement shifted to the industry that could support agricultural research.7 With the birth of a large seed industry there arose a sense of
proprietary rights over the elite plant varieties, and intellectual property
issues entered the world of agriculture.
EE.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONSERVE PLANT

GE-Nc RESOURCES
U.S. Conservation Efforts

A.

Because of the commercial incentive to innovate through the influx
of new genetic materials, national and international gene banks were
established to facilitate the collection, evaluation, and conservation of
PGR. Breeders began to make collection trips to very specific areas of
the world in an effort to amass genes for their breeding experiments
Though Russian efforts at seed storage and research suffered a
drastic downturn under the reign of Joseph Stalin,7' efforts elsewhere,
See Berlan & Lewontin, supra note 66.
Berlan and Lewontin suggest that increased yields due to hybrids may have been
a myth or a case of commercial propaganda. A combination of events coincided with
the introduction of hybrids, any one or more of which may have caused the actual
yield increases:
"

1. The introduction of a planned breeding program itself,
2. Unprecedented effort by government agencies to develop improved varieties in support
of a hybrid-seed strategy,

3. Changes in cultivation techniques, crop rotation, increase in fertilizer use, mechanization, and,
4. The introduction of more efficient experimental and statistical test procedures.
Id.; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 92-94. But see Major M. Goodman, In
Review: First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000,

DIVERSrTY, vol. 5., no. 1 (1989), at 33, 34 (disputing conclusions by Lewontin, conclusions accepted by Kloppenburg, regarding the feasibility of producing non-hybrid high-

yield crops).
7 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 9-11.
7, See Berlan & Lewontin, supra note 66.
n See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 73.
The personal fate of Vavilov suffered as well. Stalin was suspicious of scientific
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particularly in the United States, increased. In the first third of the
twentieth century, the U.S. State Department sent fifty expeditions to
search for useful new plant types.74
The Regional Plant Introduction Station, the first center for the
conservation of crop germplasm, was established in Ames, Iowa in
1947.' In 1948, another center was established in Geneva, New York,
and in 1949, two more were added in Experiment, Georgia and Pullman,
Washington.76 In 1959, the U.S. Department of Agriculture established
the first national gene bank, the National Seed Storage Laboratory
(NSSL), at Fort Collins, Colorado.' The NSSL also represented the first
national attempt at long-term refrigerated seed storage.
B. International Conservation Efforts
By the 1960s, both national and international efforts increased to
collect and preserve PGR, especially from tropical and subtropical areas.79 Two motivations drove these efforts: research facilitation and conservation. The first motivation stemmed from the desire to house the
building materials (the genes) in international "genetic warehouses"
accessible to all, rather than have them haphazardly stored in various
jurisdictions throughout the globe. Centralization was believed to facilitate
the development of newer and better crops for the entire world.
The second incentive recognized the need to preserve genetic information being lost to twentieth century development. By the 1950s, the
centers of diversity and the genetic resources they contained were fast
disappearing.' The rate of genetic erosion was especially high in the

works originating in the capitalist world. A rival of Vavilov scoffed at his application
of the principles of genetics to agricultural policies and at his introduction and use of
exotic germplasm. Vavilov was eventually arrested in the Ukraine while on a mission
to collect indigenous Ukrainian plants that were being replaced by Russian varieties. He
was charged with agricultural sabotage and imprisoned. The pioneer of agricultural
research died soon after in Siberia of malnutrition. See JUMA, supra note 43, at 17-19.
Long-term storage facilities would not be established in the Soviet Union until the
1970s; see also D.L. Plucknett et al., Crop Germplasm Conservation and Developing
Countries, 220 ScENcE 163 (1983).
"' Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Plant Genetic Resources: The
Common Bowl, in SEEDs AND SOvEREIGNTY, supra note 18, at 6.
iS See Plucknett et al., supra note 73.
7' See JUMA, supra note 43, at 86.

See id. at 87.
7, See Plucknett et al., supra note 73.
7' See id.
W

See June Starr & Kenneth C. Hardy, Not by Seeds Alone: The Biodiversity Treaty
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Mediterranean region and in the Near East, a major diversity center for
wheat and other grains." Despite this, the initial efforts were probably
motivated less by conservation concerns than by the potential to facilitate
research.' In 1961, the FAO organized the first international technical
meeting on plant exploration and introduction.83 The primary result of
this conference was a proposal to assemble a panel of experts to advise
and assist efforts to find and map plant genetic resources."
In 1967, the FAQ and the International Biological Program convened
a second technical conference at FAO's Rome headquarters.' Diversity
loss was a more prominent issue at this second conference, and strategies
were discussed to counter genetic erosion.' The most significant proposal to emerge from this conference was a call to establish a global network of gene banks to store representative collections of the main varieties of foodY Priority was given to preserving the land races, many of
which were immediately threatened.88 The conference also called for the
implementation of long-term storage methods as opposed to the thencommon practice of regeneration every few years.89
To oversee this global system, the FAO, along with the World Bank
and the U.N. Development Program, founded the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971. Today the CGIAR
remains the primary caretaker of the international germplasm collections.
Its membership includes governments, private foundations, and regional
development banks.
Even before the 1967 Conference and the formation of the CGIAR,
a number of international research centers had been established to facilitate the development of an international gene bank system.' Under the
initiative and funding of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, four

and the Role for Native Agriculture, 12 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 85, 104 (1993).
SI

See JUMA, supra note 43, at 87.

See Otto H. Frankel, Genetic Resources: Evolutionary and Social Responsibilities,
in SEEDS AND SOvEREIGNTY, supra note 18, at 21 [hereinafter Frankel, Genetic
Resources].
See Plucknett et al., supra note 73.
fSee Starr & Hardy, supra note 80, at 104.

8 The International Biological Program is a non-governmental arm of the International Council of Scientific Unions. See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at
21.
8 The term "genetic resources" was coined at the 1967 Conference. See id. at 21.
r See id.
8' See id.

See Plucknett et al., supra note 73.

9 See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 26.
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International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) were established between 1960 and 1967: the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in
the Philippines (1960), the International Maize and Wheat Improvement
Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico (1966), the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (UTA) in Nigeria (1967), and the International Center for
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Columbia (1967).
The CGIAR eventually took control of the IARCs and the international system of gene banks developed through these centers. Today, there
are sixteen IARCs, mostly located in developing countries.9 Twelve of
the sixteen hold germplasm collections, together holding well over
500,000 samples representing more than 3,000 species. 2 Aside from
being centers of germplasm storage, the IARCs function as centers of
international research and testing of crop germplasm. A large part of
their mission is to train scientists for national agricultural research programs.94 As such, the IARCs serve as a source of information and technology-sharing for the benefit of scientists in developing countries.'
Between 1968 and 1973, the FAO panel of experts on plant exploration and introduction and the FAO Crop Ecology Unit's genetic resources
group attempted to implement the recommendations of the 1967
Conference." In areas where land races were threatened, they sponsored
surveys of genetic resources, defined collecting priorities, and surveyed
storage facilities.' They outlined the methodology of long-term seed
storage, planned education and training, and designed the global storage
network."
In 1972, two high-profile international gatherings emphasized the
need to coordinate international PGR activities. One was the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, out of which came a
resolution calling for an international program to preserve the germplasm
of tropical crops. 99 The other was the Beltsville Conference in Maryland,

9, See id.
Ismail Serageldin, Genetic Resources Conservation in the CGJAR: Protecting an
IrreplaceableResource for Future Generations, DivERsrrY, vol. 10, no. 2 (1994), at 19.
9
See id.
'
See id.

9 See id.
9 See JUMA, supra note 43, at 88-89; Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82,
at 22.
9 See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 22.

See id.
99See Plucknett et al., supra note 73.
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which recommended the establishment of the International Board for Plant
Genetic Resources (IBPGR).?
The IBPGR was subsequently established in 1974 with a secretariat
in the FAO and financial resources provided by the CGIAR.'"' The
LBPGR's goal is to encourage and coordinate efforts to conserve, docu-

ment, evaluate, and use plant germplasm.' ° This organization has served
as the primary international coordinator of worldwide genetic resource ac-

tivities." In 1993, the IBPGR was reorganized and renamed the IPGRI

(International Plant Genetic Resources Institute). °4

IV. THE GREEN REVOLUTION
A. The High-Yield Breakthrough

These international efforts precipitated a dramatic revolution in world
agriculture. The "Green Revolution," as it came to be called, began with

the development in the late 1960s of a new set of high-yield varieties that

greatly increased agricultural production. 5 The Green Revolution dramatically boosted world food supply and was considered a great triumph,
one that earned its instigator, Norman Borlaug, a Nobel Peace Prize."6
Unfortunately, the success of these Green Revolution "super crops" has
come at the expense of traditional cultivars, many of which have been
overrun by the high-yield varieties." 7 For this and other reasons, the
Green Revolution has also been condemned by some as an ecological

disaster."3

'" See

id.

.0.See Jack Harlan, Our Vanishing Genetic Resources, 188 SCIENCE 618, 619
(1975). Though physically placed in the FAO, the IBPGR was formed as an institution

under the CGIAR. The IBPGR budget has been set directly by national governments
rather than through the United Nations. See KLOPPENBURG, supra, note 7, at 164.
,o See Starr & Hardy, supra note 80, at 105.
, See JUMA, supra note 43, at 89.
'o' Ruth D. Raymond, Conserving Nature's Biodiversity: The Role of the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, DIvERsrrY, vol. 9, no. 3 (1993), at 17.
" See Kloppenburg, supra note 7, at 157-61; see also Kloppenburg & Kleinman,

supra note 74, at 1-3.
'" Borlaug received the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. See Kloppenburg &
Kleinman, supra note 74, at 1. Note that Borlaug's prize was for peace. He was recognized not for a breakthrough scientific discovery, but rather for his management over
the distribution of high-yield varieties of wheat. His contribution to the eradication of
world hunger was thought to facilitate peace and security in the human population. See

id.
" See, e.g., JUMA, supra note 43, at 100-03.
,03 See id. at 65.
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The Green Revolution took root in the International Center for Maize
and Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT), the IARC established in Mexico in
1966.'" Through its early years, the Wheat Program at CIMMYT was
headed by American geneticist, Norman Borlaug." ° During Borlaug's
directorship, a wheat variety known as "Norin 10" came to his
attention.' Norin 10 was a variety of wheat brought from Japan to the
United States in 1946, and was noted for its diminutive stature."'
Borlaug discovered that by inserting the dwarfing genes from the Norin
10 variety into Mexican wheat lines, the resulting offspring were dwarf
varieties that, in response to heavy fertilizer applications, gave unprecedented wheat yields." 3 Soon afterwards, a similar discovery was made
with rice at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), the Philippines IARC."' 4 The "Dee-gee-woo-gen" gene, originating in China, also
produced unprecedented boosts in rice yields.' 5
The impact of these discoveries was felt almost immediately. It
allowed farmers, at least on a temporary basis, to cover the food requirements of an expanding human population." 6' One noted expert, H. Garrison Wilkes, stated over a decade ago that "[t]he specific use of the
dwarfing gene from Norin 10 has affected the food supply of one quarter
plus) and for over 100 million it
of the people of the world (one billion
' 7
has been the margin of survival." "

See id. at 170; Wilkes, supra note 18, at 18.
",oSee State of the Art Genebank at CIMMYT to Usher in "Double Green Revolution," DivmtsrrY, vol. 12, no. 3 (1996), at 4.
"'. See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 74, at 1-3.
112See id.
"3 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
'"
See M.S. Swaminathan, Seeds and Property Rights: A View From the CGIAR
System, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 18, at 231; KEYSTONE REPORT, supra
note 15, at 2.
u5 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
116 See id. at 3.
"' H. Garrison Wilkes, Current Status of Crop Germplasm, I CRnrCAL REV. PLANT
SCI. 133, 142 (1983). In addition, there were environmentally friendly aspects of the
Revolution: less space used to grow more productive crops meant less pressure to
convert forests to farmland. "By sustaining adequate levels of output on land already
being farmed in environments suitable for agriculture, we restrain and even reverse the
drive to open more fragile lands to cultivation." Buffett, supra note 29, at 16 (quoting
Norman Borlaug); see also KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 73.
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B. The Aftermath of the Green Revolution
Never before in human history have there been comparable monocultures
... of billions of genetically similar plants covering millions of acres
across whole continents."'
1. Genetic Erosion
The negative aspects of the Green Revolution are now believed by
many to outweigh its benefits." 9 The move toward hybridization has
already begun to erode the genetic diversity of much of the world's
croplands, especially in the developed world." The Green Revolution
has been instrumental in spreading that erosion to the developing world
as well.' The ultimate price may be a collapse of that same food supply
somewhere down the road, a direct result of the farming practices encouraged by the Revolution.
Through the Green Revolution, a great number of varieties that
formerly served as an agricultural insurance plan have been cast aside. As
traditional varieties have been replaced and abandoned, some have
become extinct. In the process their genetic characteristics, the raw
materials, have been lost.' As one author states, "The technological
bind of improved varieties is that they eliminate the resource upon which
they are based."'"
Within a century, genetic diversity became economically obsolete.
The push toward commercially mass-produced high-yield hybrids and
Green Revolution "super crops" led to the abandonment of diverse, but
relatively low-yielding land races."z Insects, fungal pathogens, and other
dangers that might threaten a genetically narrow base are now subdued
through irrigation, machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides. Because higher
income from higher yields offsets the time and expense of implementing
Us Wilkes, supra note 18, at 73.
119See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 6.
2 See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 40-41.
121 See The Vanishing Seeds, supra note 54, at 163.
'"

12
1

See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 162 (quoting Garrison Wilkes).
See The Vanishing Seeds, supra note 54; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7,

at 121.
'2 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note
7, at 121-22 (drawing a parallel between the genetic erosion resulting from the spread
of hybrid com in the United States and that resulting from the spread of Green
Revolution wheat and rice in the developing world).
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these technological solutions, the incentive to continue propping up the
monocultures and neglecting land races persists despite ample warnings of
the risks.'"
Incidents before and during the Green Revolution illustrate the danger of having too many eggs in one basket. The most memorable incident
is the Irish Potato Famine of 1846."2 The potato came to Europe from
South America in the post-Columbian exchange of species." Potatoes
were introduced to Ireland in the eighteenth century, and proved a
tremendous boon to the Irish poor. The population tripled to eight million, a direct result of this cheap and plentiful new crop. 29
The potatoes introduced consisted of a fairly small number of genetic
varieties. They did very well initially in a land absent their native diseases. However, this head start did not hold up. The diseases of Ireland
eventually "figured out" the potato before the potato could mount a
genetic defense. In 1846, an unknown disease caused by the fungus
Phutophtora infestans attacked. The result: half the crop was lost, two
million Irish died, two million more emigrated, and much of the remaining population was thrown back into a state of abject poverty. 3°
Today, of course, farmers have technological weapons to combat the
less benevolent forces in nature. Even in this age of pesticides, herbicides
and fertilizers, however, pathogens are sometimes able to exploit specific
weaknesses passed down from common parent lines. For instance, in the
1940s, most of the American oat crop was planted in lines derived from
32
the same "Victoria" variety.' In 1946, the "Victoria blight" hit.
This disease, to which this particular variety was uniquely susceptible,
caused major damage to the crop.' Likewise, in 1970, ninety percent
of the corn crop in the United States shared genetic material from the
same parent line.' A particular fungus attacked a cytoplasmic character
passed down from this parent, and the resulting "Corn Blight of 1970"

'2
'27

See Klinkenborg, supra note 31, at 77.
See Wilkes & Wilkes, supra note 67, at 35; see also Wilkes, supra note 18, at

73-75.
"z See Wilkes, supra note 18, at 73.
'29 See id. at 75.
0 See id. Irish emigration might be seen as a delayed step in the Columbian
Exchange. The Americas sent potatoes to Ireland. In return Ireland sent two million
Irishmen Cf. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at xii.
,', See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 74, at 6.
132 See id.
133 See id.
'"' See id.
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cut yields by fifteen percent, costing farmers hundreds of millions of
dollars. 35
Green Revolution super crops introduced into developing countries
have also shown signs of weakness. According to a FAO regional representative, Green Revolution rice yields are declining in Asia.'36 The
Revolution's potential pitfall is summed up nicely in the following
anecdote, concerning elite rice cultivars:
When the IR-8 variety was attacked by the tungro disease, the farms
switched to IR-20, but this hybrid proved vulnerable to grassy stunt
virus and brown hopper insects. The farmers were then supplied with
the IR-26 hybrid which appeared to be resistant to most of the diseases
and pests in the country but it proved vulnerable to strong winds. When
the breeders decided to try the original Taiwanese variety that withstood
strong winds, they found that it had been lost as Taiwanese farmers
planted their farms with IR-8.'
2. Environmental Degradation
A second criticism of the high-yield monocultures is that even if
farmers are able to stay one technological step ahead of the assaults on
their narrowly based crops, the price paid is more than just the out-ofpocket expense of the fertilizers and pesticides. The environmental
degradation resulting from these farming practices, if not faced in the
present, will have to be dealt with in the future.
The "elite" hybrids and Green Revolution varieties might fairly be
described as "high-responding" rather than "high-yielding."''
Most
agricultural crops are not self-supporting, they must be cultivated by
humans before they will produce. The concern over the elite varieties,
however, is the degree to which they must be supported, and the nature
of the support system. The catalysts used to trigger these crops' impressive responses are generous applications of environmentally harmful nitrogen fertilizers and chemical pesticides.'39
The harmful effects of pesticides are now widely recognized, due in
large part to the 1962 publication of The Silent Spring by Rachel Car-

"3

See id; see also Plucknett, supra note 73; JUMA, supra note 43, at 102.

See Martin Khor, Asia: The Greening of the Green Revolution, Inter Press Service, Sept. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
'
'

JUMA, supra note 43, at 100.

'

See The Vanishing Seeds, supra note 54, at 163.

139 See

id.
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son.'" Along with poisoning the environment, pesticides also are no
proof against monoculture weakness. Just as insects and other pests can
figure out narrowly based genetic defenses, they can figure out chemical
defenses
as well. An effective pesticide one year may prove useless the
14
next.

1

The damage due to the use of chemical fertilizers, particularly nitrogen, is a cause of increasing concern as well. Though chemical fertilizers
are able to pump nutrients into specific plants, facilitating their growth as
individual organisms, they interfere with the natural ecosystem and make
it more difficult for the system to support itself in the future. 4 Under
fertilizer applications, the soil's natural cycles, which regulate nutrient
uptake, are thrown into high gear. Organic matter is stripped away, and
with it goes the ability of the soil to maintain itself. 43 Soil texture,
nutrient stores, and the ability to hold moisture are all diminished.' 44
Absent rehabilitation, the land is rendered infertile, and the continuous
influx of chemicals becomes a necessity. 45
3. Lessons Unlearned
Comparisons between the Irish Potato Famine and the Green Revolution should not be taken lightly. The effect of the Irish potato was to
ratchet up the population of the countryside, as more and more poor Irish
crowded onto the wide pedestal balanced upon a genetically narrow base.
When this base finally snapped, two million Irish perished, and two
million more set sail for America to avoid the misery of starvation.
The Green Revolution super crops, on the other hand, were a crisis
response. The possibility of mass starvation loomed if these high-yield
cultivars were not introduced. No other choice was apparent at the time,
and in the short term, the solution succeeded. The solution did not,
however, strike at the root of the problem. The end result could parallel
that of the Irish potato. Instead of millions, billions now crowd onto the
pedestal. Replacing land races with elite cultivars increases the size of the
pedestal, but does so by continuously chipping building materials from
the already thin support stand.
The Green Revolution, despite its shortcomings, might have been
used to buy the time needed to figure out more sustainable solutions. In

'40 RACHEL CARSON,

THE SILENT SPRING

,4, See Klinkenborg, supra note 31, at 80.
,42 See id. at 77.
" See id.
'44 See id.
" See id.

(1962).
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some respects, however, it appears to have diverted our attention from the
larger problem. Biotechnology allows us to stay out in front of the food
crisis for the moment. Yet the crisis looms still. According to the
CGIAR, food production lagged behind population growth in seventy-five
developing countries during the 1980s." Moreover, the FAO Secretary
General has offered the grim opinion that "[iln the case of some staple
foods, there is scarcely any more chance of increasing yields," adding
further that "[p~lant diseases and damage incidence are increasing." 47 If
the human population cannot come to grips with its own prolific growth,
the Green Revolution, and the biotech revolution on its heels, will have
purchased time not to solve the problem, but to build a bigger one."
V. BIOTECHNOLOGY: RAISING THE FINANCIAL STAKES

The field of biotechnology emerged in the 1980s. It builds upon the
foundation laid down by Mendel, Vavilov, and Borlaug, but promises
even more profound alterations in the agricultural industry and the battle
over genetic resources. 49 The enormous potential to isolate and exploit
specific genetic characteristics will result in greater opportunities to
engineer new life forms."s This potential, coupled with the huge expense of conducting such research, makes issues involving ownership and
preservation of genetic materials more pressing. The desire of the United
States to protect its biotechnology industry was the major factor causing
it to balk at signing the Biodiversity Convention in Rio.
The event usually cited as the origin of modem biotechnology is the
discovery, in 1953, by J.D. Watson and Francis Crick of the double
helical structure of the deoxyribonucleic acid molecule, better known as
DNA.'5' One result of this discovery is that agricultural science has

" See Agricultural Research Brings Big Crop Gains, UPI, Feb. 6, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
47 Fading Plant Diversity Spells More Hunger, Warns FAO, Deutsche PresseAgentur, June 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
" The effects of population growth on world food supply was one topic at the
FAO-sponsored World Food Summit, that was held in Rome in November, 1996.
,e See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 589.
,5 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 2-4.
1I

The DNA molecule contains nature's blueprints, determining the hereditary characteristics

passed on from one generation of plant or animal to its offspring. Watson's and Crick's
work touched off an avalanche of genetic research seeking to unlock the secrets hidden
within the double helix. Their early work has since given rise to the modem multibillion dollar industry known as biotechnology.

David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the European Community, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 990, 993-94 (1993) [hereinafter Scalise & Nugent, Patenting
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become a more focused endeavor. No longer restricted by the hit-and-miss

vagaries of traditional breeding methods, breeders are now able to move
beyond simple Mendelian techniques:
Application of biotechnology in agriculture has resulted in faster and
more accurate methods of enhancing crop production than those formerly
attained through selective breeding techniques. By studying a plant's
genetic blueprints, researchers can isolate and alter the genetic material
that determines its specific characteristics. Therefore, scientists can
achieve in one generation with certainty what might have otherwise required years or decades of specialized breeding.'52

Biotechnology also possesses the potential to wean agriculture of
chemical pesticides and fertilizers by efficiently enhancing genetic defenses and growth mechanisms.'53 The CGIAR stated its determination to
' Nonetheuse biotechnology to steer crop production in this direction. 54
less, there is ample evidence at present that biotechnology research is
directed at increasing the consumption of chemicals. 5 Crops are being
developed that are uniquely responsive to particular brands of herbicides.'56 Perhaps this is inevitable when some of the leading pesticide
companies are moving to monopolize the seed industry."n A major

Living Matter].

,52 Id. at 994. However, those intimately familiar with the science of plant breeding
state that, for now at least, biotechnological breakthroughs supplement, rather than replace traditional breeding methods. See generally Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note
82; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 202-07. The two sciences of molecular
biology and plant breeding come from vastly different perspectives. They often find
communication, and, therefore coordination, difficult. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7,
at 220-22.
,' Frankel, Landraces, supra note 24, at 15; see also Scalise & Nugent, Patenting
Living Matter, supra note 151, at 994-95.
'" See Frederick Brown, Serageldin Credited with CGIAR Renaissance, DIVERSrrY,

vol. 10, no. 4 (1994), at 5, 7-8.
15
See JUMA, supra note 43, at 112.
356 The Monsanto Company, a leading pesticide producer (and maker of the familiar
brand, "Roundup") provides one example of this approach. Monsanto research produces
herbicide-resistant crops. Competing weeds can thus be thoroughly doused and effectively obliterated while growth of the desired crop is unimpaired. See id. at 113.
'"' See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 207-20. This symbiotic paring of chemical
and crop need not be nurtured within a parent chemical/subsidiary seed company
atmosphere, however. For example, agrichemical company American Cyanamid simply
provided a genetic "gift" to Pioneer Hi-Bred, the largest corn seed producer in the
world and a company not controlled by American Cyanamid. The gift, however, was
uniquely self-serving: a gene altered to tolerate American Cyanamid herbicides. See
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controversy exists regarding the direction of research in this area. A
sometimes skeptical public listens as agrichemical and seed companies
laud the development, not of pesticide-free crops, but of a "safer" generation of pesticides.'58
Apart from suspicions concerning the self-interests of chemical
manufacturers, there is a more general skepticism in less-developed
regions concerning the potential benefits of biotechnology. The Southern
view is that biotechnology is just another tool to widen the standard of
living gap between the North and South.' 9 Some commentators in the
South simply fear the uncertain effect biotech advances will have on
regions of the world ill-prepared for such technological surprises."w As
discussed, fear of being left behind in the new biotechnologically enhanced world prompted developing countries to demand that the
Biodiversity Convention contain a commitment to technology-sharing.''
Southern attempts to become biotechnology business partners, however,
have not been well-received by the biotech industry.
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES GOVERNING PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES

A. U.S. Plant-RelatedIntellectual Property Rights
1. Owning Genetic Codes
Genetic manipulation today is more scientific, more focused, and
more precise than ever before. While farmers toil in their fields, agricultural scientists busy themselves in laboratories, trying to produce superior
seeds. Like the farmer, the scientist expects to profit from her labors.
Unlike the farmer, however, the scientist's product is much less tangible.

JUMA, supra note 43, at 114. As mentioned earlier, however, the relationship between
plant, "pest," and chemical is not static. Several dozen weed species and several hundred insect species are known to have developed their own agrichemical resistances
through evolutionary processes. See id. at 113.
, See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 654 n.217.
,5 See Klaus Bosselmann, Focus: Plants and Politics: The International Legal
Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 111, 127 (1996).

" Prior to his appointment as Executive Secretary for the Secretariat for the
Biodiversity Convention, Dr. Calestous Juma, a Kenyan, opined that "[t]he potential

impacts of advances in biotechnology will not only be irreversible, but they will also
introduce major and unpredictable transformations in the global organization and
distribution of production which will have far-reaching implications for Africa." See
JUMA, supra note 43, at 1.
16,

See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 16.
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It is not strictly the seed itself. It is the idea behind the seed, the process
of designing a successful genetic combination. Once the seed hits the
market, however, competitors can copy the design without having spent
the time and energy on development. The "seed designer," therefore,
needs some method of protecting her idea.
Seed companies contend that this need to protect their investment
entitles them to intellectual property protection over their genetic creations. Indeed, the economic considerations are similar, and the subject
matter may seem an appropriate graft onto the patent law regime.
Philosophical considerations, however, concerning ownership of
biological processes have caused some to reject this new branch of the
regime. At the level of conflict between Northern and Southern countries,
it has not been so much a matter of how one feels about the appropriateness of the particular graft, but how one feels about the entire organism.
Southern countries see intellectual property protection as a method of
denying them valuable technology."
The United States, the country with the largest seed industry and the
strongest biotech industry, is not coincidentally a leading advocate of
plant-related intellectual property rights." It is the policy of the United
States to ensure that its version of an expansive intellectual property
regime includes protection for all plant varieties. Even the United States,
however, faced some initial trouble accepting the concept of placing
patents on life.
2. U.S. Patent Law
U.S. patent law originates within Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact laws protecting inventions and discoveries.' The first patent act was passed in 1790."
The most recent version is the Patent Act of 1952, which retains the
original act's three basic requirements for an invention to be eligible for

,62 See generally PAT R. MOONEY, SEEDs OF THE EARTh (1980).
'
See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIs 3 (1984); see also Hamilton, supra note 5, at
611.
'64 U.S. CONST. arL I, § 8, cl. 8.
'"' See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property
Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the
Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 83, 89 (1995) [hereinafter
Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property].
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a "standard utility patent": the invention must be novel, useful, and nonobvious.'"
Traditionally, the courts have excluded certain subject matter as
unsuitable for patent protection. Examples of items considered per se
unpatentable include scientific principles, laws of nature, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, and products of nature." The "products of nature" exception has been the traditional bar to patents on plants. It is
based on the notion that something already existing in nature cannot be
"novel," and therefore cannot be patented.1'
The "products of nature" exception, however, is harder to justify in
connection with modem plant breeding efforts. Though certainly the
tinkerings of plant breeders cannot match what has already been accomplished in the "raw" materials, the innovations of plant breeders grow
ever more apparent in the finished product. Further, as is the case for
inventions of an inorganic nature, the business of plant breeding involves
time and expensive research. 69 Nevertheless, until the 1980s, U.S. courts
prevented plant breeders from receiving standard utility patents.
To compensate for barred access to the Patent Act, Congress enacted
statutes outside the traditional patent scheme that dealt exclusively with
the protection of plant materials. The first of these was the Plant Patent
Act of 1930 (PPA).7 ° The PPA, however, only allows patents on asexually reproduced plants.' It does not cover plants which reproduce sexually through seeds, a category comprising the bulk of U.S. agriculture."7
Nevertheless, 2,700 plant patents were issued under the PPA between
1930 and 1970.'
The emergence of the U.S. hybrid seed industry 74 and the strength'66

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988 & Supp. 1996).

67 See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 89.

See id. at 90.
See JUMA, supra note 43, at 152.

'
'o
'~'
'

See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
The PPA provides: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any

distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and

newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an
uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor ... ." Id.
" The PPA gives the inventor the exclusive right to propagate plants by asexual
reproduction by grafting, budding, cutting, layering, and division, but not by seeds. See

Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665 (S. D. Cal 1958), affd 276 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1960).
" Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 93.
174

The use of hybrid varieties helped rejuvenate the U.S. seed industry ....
With
anticipated growth potential, especially with the use of hybrids, the industry began to
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ening of plant variety protection laws by Western European nations in the
early 1960s75 spurred Congress to pass the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA) in 1970.6 The PVPA extended protection to new varieties of

sexually reproducing plants, including most commercial agricultural
crops."7 Under the PVPA, to have a plant variety certified, a breeder

must17show
that the variety has novelty, uniformity, stability, and distinct8
ness.

"Breeders' rights" obtained under the PVPA are similar, but not
identical, to intellectual property rights obtained under the Patent Act."
Though the standards are easier to comply with than those of the Patent
Act,"e° the protection offered by the PVPA for plant varieties is not as
complete.'' Until recently, the PVPA contained a major exception relating to farmers' use of certified seeds." The "farmers privilege" exception allows farmers to save seeds produced by certified varieties and

replant them without paying an additional royalty.'

Previously, "brown

bagging," a practice by which farmers could sell these first generation
seeds to other farmers as "just like" the commercial varieties, was also
sanctioned.'4 In 1994, however, Congress revised the PVPA to eliminate the unauthorized sale of seeds from certified varieties." S In addiexpand although it remained diverse in the 1930s .

. .

. By the 1960s, 10 major

national U.S. firms were selling seeds, with numerous others selling to various parts of
the world.
JUMA, supra note 43, at 81.
175 See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 136-40.
176 See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988 & Supp. 1996); Scalise & Nugent,
International
Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 93.
,7 See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 93.
m See 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
,7 See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 597.
"g The purpose of substituting the word "distinctiveness"
in place of the Patent
Act's "non-obviousness" is to set a less exacting standard. See id. at 539.
...See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 94.
" See id. The PVPA also contains a narrow exception in favor of "bona fide research." See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1988 & Supp. 1996). Through this exception, breeders
can use a protected variety to develop their own varieties without having to pay a
royalty to the certificate holder. However, the derived variety must be separated from
the original by some "minimum distance" by its performance or essential characteristics.
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 598.
8

See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 599.

See id. at 532.
See Bill Adds Protectionfor Breeders of Plants, TIMES-PICAYuNE, Aug. 13, 1994,
at A14. The PVPA was amended to bring U.S. law into conformity with 1991 revisions to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties (UPOV
Convention). See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, S. 13090, 103d
"
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tion, in Asgrow v. Winterboer,86 the Supreme Court retroactively cur-

tailed this practice in relation to varieties certified prior to the
revision."
Though intellectual property laws specific to plant breeding have
been strengthened, plant breeders' actual dependence on these laws has
slackened. This is because U.S. courts now look more favorably on the
patenting of living matter. The door was opened in 1980 by the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty."' In
Chakrabarty, a genetically altered strain of bacteria useful in cleaning up

oil spills was ruled eligible for patent protection, and the court added that
patent eligibility extended to "anything under the sun made by man,"

even if the materials were alive.

89

Ex Parte Hibbard followed five years later."9 In this case, the
court specifically extended the Chakrabartyholding to plant breeding. In
Ex Parte Hibbard, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) originally
rejected a patent for a corn plant genetically engineered to possess an

abnormally high level of amino acids. 9 The PTO based its decision on
Cong., 140 CONG. REc. 133 (1994).
6 513 U.S. 179 (1995).

" The Supreme Court limited the farmer's right to sell seeds to only that amount
necessary to replant the farmer's own acreage. See id. This remained an issue even
with the new law in place because the 1994 revision did not erase the exemptions attached to pre-1994 certificates. A pre-1994 PVPA certificate offers protection of the
variety and a brown bagging exemption for 18 years. See Supreme Court Hears
Arguments on Asgrow v. Winterboer Case, DivnRSrrY, vol. 10, no. 4 (1994), at 41.
1- 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
'8 Id. at 309. Chakrabarty involved a genetically engineered strain of bacteria
capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil. Chakrabarty, the inventor,
had devised a method of introducing plasmids (genetic components of a cell outside the
nucleus) into a host bacteria. Only the modified bacteria, not the bacteria as it occurred
in nature, is capable of breaking down the oil molecule. See Scalise & Nugent,

International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 96.

Chakrabarty's standard utility patent application was denied by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) on the grounds that microorganisms are living "products of
nature" and therefore not patentable. See id. The Patent Board of Appeals (Patent
Board) disagreed, noting that Chakrabarty's modified bacteria were not, in fact, naturally
occurring. Nevertheless, the Patent Board also denied the patent on the grounds that
Congress intended the 1930 PPA to be the sole source of intellectual property protection for this type of living matter. (The PVPA was not available in this case as it
specifically excludes bacteria. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988).) The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that living matter was not per se barred from standard utility patent
protection. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
'go 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Int. 1985).
'g'

See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 98.
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the view that Congress had intended the 1970 PVPA to be the exclusive
source of intellectual property protection for sexually reproducing
plants. The Patent Board, citing Chakrabarty, reversed and held that
nor the PVPA expressly excluded protection under the
neither the PPA
93
Patent Act.
The PTO signaled a full retreat in its Notice of April 7, 198729' In
this official notice, the PTO indicated that, in deference to the
Chakrabartydecision, it would begin issuing patents to "anything under
the sun that is made by man," including all "non-naturally occurring nonhuman multi-cellular living organisms, including animals .... ""
U.S. plant breeders can now seek the more complete protection
offered by a standard utility patent. Patents may remain out of reach for
some varieties, due to the inexact nature of traditional breeding methods
and the resulting inability to meet the stringent disclosure requirements of
the Patent Act.' Other varieties, however, particularly those most markedly the product of biotechnological manipulation," can be patented
and can therefore circumvent the research and farmers' exemptions found
in the PVPA 98 Hybrid corn is included in this latter category of plant
varieties able to meet the requirements for a standard utility patent."9
Pioneer Hi-Bred, one of the leading U.S. corn producers, began securing
patents for some of its hybrids in the late 1980s.' Recently, Pioneer
announced that it will seek patents for all its corn hybrids." The move
will allow Pioneer to impose license fees on other companies for using

See id.
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 595 n.29.
'94 See 1077 OFFIciAL GAz. PAT. OFFICE 24, 31 (April 21, 1987).
' Id. (emphasis added).
'9 See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 100.
Scalise and Nugent explain why genetically engineering a plant variety, as
opposed to standard breeding methods, would make it easier to obtain standard utility
patent protection:
The process of genetic engineering entails isolating the DNA molecule that represents
a desired characteristic and replacing that molecule with new DNA material that contains
the living code for reproducing said characteristics. This is an exact science, subject to
precise descriptions of replication. Conversely, the art of plant breeding involves the
blending of two plants and is not subject to the type of exacting specifications required
for a utility patent ....
Id. at 100 n.71.
'9' See id. at 101.
,99 See Anne Fitzgerald, Pioneer to Patent Seed Corn Hybrids, Das MoINs REG.,
Apr. 9, 1996, at S8.
19

'"

" See id.
2 See id.
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Pioneer hybrids in research and development efforts, and impose royalties
on farmers who bring Pioneer products to market.'
B. InternationalTreatment of Plant-RelatedIntellectual Property Rights
1. WIPO and the Paris Union
Modem attempts to coordinate general patent laws internationally
date from the Paris Convention of 1883. The Paris Convention did
not create a harmonized international patent system. Rather, it created a
system of reciprocity whereby the parties agree to offer the same level of
protection to both foreign and domestic applicants.' In 1967, the Unit-

ed Nations established the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) to oversee international intellectual property agreements, including
the Paris Convention. WIPO's initial mission was to organize the
creation of an international patent system providing some minimal level
of protection upon universal filing.
WIPO's attempts to create this basic level of international protection
have not been successful. As an agent of the United Nations, WIPO has
generally served as the voice of the developing world on the subject of
international patent treatment, calling for increases in technology transfer

and some restraints on patent coverage.'

WIPO has not been inclined

to support inclusion of plant varieties within the scope of patentable sub-

' See id. In contrast to the more lenient PVPA, under the Patent Act the breeders'
rights more clearly flow into each generation of crops planted by the farmer. If the
farmer purchases seeds, grows his crop, and gathers some of the seeds from that crop
to replant, he will find that intellectual property rights have attached with the genetic
code on the second generation seeds. The patent holder may condition sale or replanting of the product upon payment of royalties. See Scalise & Nugent, International
Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 101.
' See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 106
n.84.
' The Paris Convention provides for (1) national treatment, providing foreign applicants the same access to intellectual property protection as domestic applicants, (2)
right of foreign priority, recognizing the original date of foreign application, and (3)
establishment by national jurisdictions of basic unfair competition laws in relation to
international trade. Id. at 106.
See id.
Absent a unified system, an applicant must file in each jurisdiction where
protection is sought. See id.
"
See id. at 107.
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As such, WIPO is looked upon with some suspicion by

industry forces in the developed world.'

2. UPOV Convention
Despite WIPO's reluctance, there have been international efforts to

provide intellectual property protection for plant varieties. The organization responsible for coordinating these efforts is the International Union
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), established in
1961.20" UPOV is an organization whose members are parties to the

International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV Convention), entered into by European nations in 1961 and

amended in 1978 to allow non-European countries to join." As of
January 1996, thirty nations had joined UPOV." Along with the United
States and all members of the European Union, UPOV membership
consists of developed or rapidly developing nations; those nations with
the greatest incentive to secure strong patent protection.2 3
The goal of the UPOV Convention is to introduce uniformity in

plant variety protection laws while allowing for variations in national
plant patent legislation.2" ' Like the Paris Union, UPOV calls for nondiscrimination of foreign applicants and recognition of the original
application date within any member jurisdiction for purposes of priority.2,5 Under UPOV, plant breeders can protect new plant varieties for a
limited time, preventing others from producing propagating materials of
their protected variety. 216 Under a set of 1991 amendments, UPOV

' See id.; see also Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and PharmaceuticalPatents,
103 YALE LJ. 223, 237 (1993).
See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 107.
230 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 815
U.N.T.S. 89 (1961). UPOV is located in Geneva and is housed with WIPO. See
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 605.
21 See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 605.
232 See Chile Signs Up to International Plant Variety Convention, European Information Service, Agri Service International, Dec. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
2,3 See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at
108.
The United States joined the UPOV Convention in 1981. See Hamilton, supra note 5,
at 605.
214 See JUMA, supra note 43, at 156.
2,5 See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 108.
236 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra, note 15, at 35, app. A. The Keystone Report
summarizes the protections provided under the 1978 version of UPOV and the 1991
amendment (which was not scheduled to enter into force until 1995) as follows:
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members may also offer standard utility patent rights for plant varieties
in addition to or alternatively to plant breeder rights like those provided
for in the United States under the PPA and PVPA 1 The UPOV Convention was further amended in 1991 to include an optional farmers'
exemption, allowing farmers to save and replant protected variety seeds
but not to sell them."' The 1991 amendments serve generally, however,
to strengthen breeders' rights. 9

Plant Variety Protection (PVP) is a specific system of protection for plant varieties. It
has analogies to patents, but also important differences. Rights are granted for a limited
period of time (typically 20 years) to the breeder of the specific unit of plant material
that constitutes a plant variety. In contrast to rights granted under patent systems, the
breeder of a protected plant variety cannot seek exclusive rights in a unique feature of
her/his variety. The breeder of the first blue rose cannot monopolize blueness. It is open
to all other breeders to breed and protect blue roses which are distinct from the first
such variety ....
Under the [1978 UPOV Convention], the holder of [PVP] can prevent others from
producing propagating material of the variety, and can prevent others from marketing
such material. Under the [1991 Amendment] . . . the Breeder's Right has been further
extended to harvested material produced from propagating material whose use was not
authorized by the breeder, unless the breeder has had reasonable opportunity to exercise
his right in relation to the propagated material ....
The breeders' permission is also required . . . for the repeated use of the variety in
question as a parent line [to produce hybrids, or as of the 1991 Amendment, to produce
a variety which is "essentially derived" from the parent, retaining virtually the entire
genetic stucture of the parent] ....
[Subject to the above restrictions, a]ny protected variety can be freely used as a plant
genetic resource for the purpose of breeding other varieties ....

Id.
217 See id. Under the 1978 version, in reference to a particular species, parties could
offer either separate plant variety protection laws or standard utility patents. Parties

could not make both available for the same species. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at

605.
218 See Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer
(and the
Crop)?: Contract Production and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73

NEB. L. REV. 48, 101 (1994). As noted earlier, the United States modified its plant
protection laws to comply with this latest version of UPOV. See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, S. 13090, 103d Cong., 140 CONG. REC. 133 (1994).
219 See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 606. Though adding and tightening protections

offered plant breeders, the actual effect of the 1991 amendments on biotechnology is
apparently in the eyes of the beholder. Compare id. (stating that the amendments

"increase the IPR protection available for the products of biotechnology"), with Scalise
& Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 109 (stating that the

amendments are a "drawback" and render the convention "potentially meaningless for
the biotechnology industry"; and "regarding the needs of the biotech industry, UPOV
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3. GATT: Trade-Related Intellectual Property Accord
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) is another
forum for international treatment of intellectual property issues. In contrast
to WIPO, the direction of GATT negotiations have been determined to a
great extent by the dominant world trade nations.' Nations that have
the greatest stake in a clear, uniformly recognized intellectual property
regime have attempted to use GATT as a vehicle to promote plant-related
intellectual property rights." The most recent Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, which began in 1986 and concluded in December of 1993,
included a Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement with a
section on plant variety protection. m
The United States was the primary force behind the TRIPs agreement.m Nevertheless, the final version of TRIPs omitted some key
provisions from the proposal originally submitted by the United States'
which called for mandatory recognition of plant patents to bring the trade
agreement in line with U.S. policy since the Ex Parte Hibbard decision.' The final version of the agreement specifically states that parties
may exclude plants from patentability, though it requires parties to
provide some form of intellectual property protection, "either by patents
or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof."'
Parties may therefore choose to offer a separate and perhaps weaker form
of breeders' rights rather than the full patent rights favored by the United
States.
It is notable, however, that GATIT requires parties to offer at least
some form of plant variety protection. The Uruguay Round produced an
agreement consistent with the 1991 UPOV Convention.' GATT, however, was negotiated by over 100 nations,' over three times the number of nations that are presently party to the UPOV Convention.'
Therefore, while some commentators bemoan the biotechnology applications left out of the GATT agreement,' others observe that the effect
is materially incomplete").
See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 115.
' See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 613.
m See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 114.
See id.
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 614.
See id. at 595, 614.

Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at 612.

See id. at 614.
2' See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 114-
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of GATT will be to compel nearly all the world's trading nations to meet
minimum intellectual property standards relating to plant varieties.O'
Developed nations will have to alter their intellectual property systems
very little, while many developing nations will have to make significant
changes to their present laws.'
VII.

THE INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING ON PLANT GENETIC

RESOURCES

A. Advent of the Seed Wars

The increased efforts during the 1970s to collect and conserve plant
genetic resources in gene banks coincided with the amendment to the
UPOV Convention in 1978 opening it to non-European nations, and
expanding international cooperation in the recognition of plant-related
intellectual property rights. Together, these events brought greater attention to questions of ownership, and how the international community
planned to manage the ex situ seed collections. 3
The United Nations, through the FAO, responded to this issue in
1983 by establishing the Global System for the Conservation and Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources. As part of the Global System, FAO
established the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources to serve as the
"world forum for discussion of use, control, and conservation of
PGR." ' The Commission's first major action was the adoption of the
International Undertaking, a non-binding resolution meant to serve as a
framework for the operation of the Global System"l6
In contrast to the broad scope of the Biodiversity Convention, the
International Undertaking focuses on conservation and use of agricultural
plants only. 7 In contrast to the UPOV Convention, established to meet
15 (stating that GATT is an "unqualified defeat for the biotechnology industry and particularly for those engaged in agricultural genetic engineering").
"' See John H. Barton, The Mediterranean Region Provides a Microcosm for the
Global Intellectual Property Rights Debate, DIVERSrrY, vol. 11, nos. 1 & 2 (1995), at

146.
2 See id. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also expands the
influence of the UPOV Convention. NAIFTA specifically requires parties to comply with
the minimum standards established by UPOV. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 616-17.
2 See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 9.
z See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 600.
23S Id.
2 See id.
2
See Gregory Rose, International Regimes for the Conservation and Control of
Plant Genetic Resources, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERvATION OF BIOLOGI-

CAL DIvERsrrY, at 145, 153 (Michael Bowman & Catherine Redgewell eds., 1996).
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the needs of a fairly homogenous group of developed nations, negotiations for the International Undertaking commenced with the intent of
establishing widespread international consensus on the issue of plant
genetic resources. Unfortunately, the international community was not yet
ready to come to terms with that issue in 1983.
Prior to the negotiations, acrimonious debate on the subject had been
sparked in part by the 1979 publication of Seeds of the Earth by Pat
Mooney." Mooney's book accused the North of "robbing" the South
of precious genetic resources and making huge profits from the theft. 9
The accusation served to rally Southern policy-makers, who came into the
FAO meeting ready to fight.2'
Policy-makers in the North, however, came into the meeting with a
decidedly different agenda. Some, perhaps, were merely interested in
maintaining the status quo. Others may have been genuinely bewildered
by the claim of theft. Unlike the extraction of, for example, minerals, the
removal of seeds does not generally deplete the resource, and samples
from the collection efforts were usually left in the host country.~" One
might speculate that many in the North simply had never considered the
need to recompense Southerners for their seeds. At any rate, in failing to
comprehend or to placate the South's frustration, the North came to the
FAO meeting unprepared for battle, yet unready to concede the validity
of the South's claims.' 2 As a result, no consensus was reached. Instead,
the South with greater numbers on their side pushed through a resolution
decidedly against the immediate economic interests of the North. The
ensuing rift came to be known as the "Seed Wars." 3
B. The Language of the International Undertaking
Article I of the International Undertaking states its objective mildly
and without controversy: "to ensure that plant genetic resources of
economic and/or social interest, particularly for agriculture, will be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for plant breeding and

23

See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 40; see generally MOONEY,

supra note 162. Pat Mooney currently heads the Rural Advancement Foundation
International (RAFI), a prominent NGO dedicated to the promotion of farmers' rights
in relation to plant genetic resources. See Profile: A Small Group with a Big Agenda
Influences Global Biodiversity: RAFI, DIVERSITY, vol. 9, no. 3 (1993), at 47.
"' See Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 40-41.
2140 See id.
241 See id.
242 See John Willoughby, Seed Wars, SAN FRAN. CHRoN., June, 2, 1991, at 14.
243 Id.
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scientific purposes." 2' The philosophical stance of the 1983 Undertakig, which stands in stark contrast to that of the Biodiversity Convention,
is contained in the second sentence of Article I.
This Undertaling is based on the universally accepted principle that
plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently
2
should be available without restriction.
This statement reflects the "common heritage" principle that plant genetic
resources exist for the benefit of humankind collectively, and cannot be
appropriated for exclusive use by any individual.2
Had this blanket "common heritage" proclamation in reference to
plant genetic resources been issued with the intent merely to cover land
races or wild germplasm, no outcry would have ensued from the laboratories of Northern seed companies. In fact, it would have been exactly the
pronouncement they would have desired, affirming their open access to
the "raw materials" necessary to construct the elite varieties.
However, Article 2 of the Undertaking makes it clear that much
more ground is covered by the term "plant genetic resources." Article 2
defines "plant genetic resources" to include the reproductive or vegetative
propagating material of:
cultivated varieties (cultivars) in current use and newly developed
varieties;
(ii) obsolete cultivars;
(iii) primitive cultivars (land races);
(iv) wild and weed species, near relatives of cultivated varieties;
(v) special genetic stocks (including elite and current breeders' lines
and mutants);247
(i)

Developing countries, by including "special genetic stocks," intended
to subject elite cultivars to the common heritage principle. In doing so,
the developing world was emphatically rejecting intellectual property
restrictions over these plant varieties.'" By the terms of the 1983 Undertaking, the common heritage blanket spreads over not only the Vaviov
Centers and third world farmers' fields, but over Northern agricultural
laboratories as well.

24

International Undertaking, supra note 2, art. 1.

245Id.
24

(emphasis added).

See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 74, at 10.

24 International Undertaking, supra note
243See Willoughby, supra note 242.

2, art. 2 (emphasis added).
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The response by the U.S. seed industry was immediate and intense.
The American Seed Trade Association declared that the International
Undertaking "strikes at the heart of free enterprise and intellectual property rights."249 The U.S. government refused to sign the Undertaking or to
join the Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, and promised no
financial support.' 0 Other developed countries followed suit."s
Developing countries countered by talking of forming a "genetic OPEC;"
several nations even declared their borders closed to germplasm
export. 2 Six years after the Rome meeting, at about the same time
developed nations were planning UPOV amendments designed to shore up
legal protections for their elite varieties, FAO established the International
Fund for Plant Genetic Resources. This act by FAO had little practical
effect absent funding from developed nations."
The International Fund came into being in an atmosphere of easing
tensions, however. Eventually, a tentative compromise was reached, due
in large part to the mediation efforts of the Colorado-based Keystone
Center.' The Keystone International Dialogue on Plant Genetic Resources (Keystone Dialogue) was initiated in 1988 to "increase mutual understanding and develop consensus recommendations on the availability,
use, exchange, and protection of plant genetic resources."" s The Keystone Dialogue brought together representatives from national governments, the seed industry, NGOs, and scientific organizations.' A series
of world-wide meetings produced a final report endorsing the concept of
an international fund for PGR conservation, including mandatory contributions by participating nations. 7
More visibly, the Keystone Dialogue led directly to a revision of the
International Undertaking that softened its approach. 8 The Interpretation
of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (Agreed
Id.
See id.
2"1The United States, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom,
249

2

and New Zealand officially indicated their unwillingness to support the Undertaking. See
supra note 7, at 174. Australia, Canada, and Japan offered no official
proclamation, but were also disinclined to support the Undertaking. See id. at 304 n.16.
25 See id; Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 74, at 11.
z See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 603.
z The Keystone Center, located in the resort area of Keystone, Colorado, is a nonprofit organization which serves as a mediator on environmental issues. See Willoughby,
supra note 242.
255 KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15, at 1.
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 604; see also KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15.
s See KEYSTONE REPORT, supra note 15.
KLOPPENBURG,

258 See id.
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The
Interpretation) was one of two amendments adopted in 1989.
an
by
including
1983
theme
of
on
the
expanded
Agreed Interpretation
to
for
compensation
called
which
Rights"
endorsement of "Farmers'
resourcgenetic
plant
develop
and
conserve
to
efforts
farmers for their
es. The Agreed Interpretation also acknowledged the legitimacy of
intellectual property protection for elite varieties." In the first of five
points, the Agreed Interpretation states unequivocally: "Plant Breeders'
Rights as provided for under UPOV . . . are not incompatible with the
International Undertaking." 2
Another amendment, The Third Annex to the Undertaking, was
passed in 19 9 1 ' The Third Annex re-emphasizes conservation of plant
genetic resources and acceptance of both Farmers' Rights and Breeders'
Rights.' It also includes a provision presaging the philosophical position staked out in the Biodiversity Convention. The Third Annex declares
"that nations have sovereign rights over their plant genetic resources."
As a result of these compromises reached in the language of the
International Undertaking, the United States and Canada agreed in 1990
to join the FAQ Commission on Plant Genetic Resources, though not to
sign the Undertaking.' The compromise did not, however, solve the
differences between the North and the South concerning control and
ownership of PGR. 7 These differences surfaced once again in the
negotiations over the Biodiversity Convention.

' See Interpretation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources,
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 25 Sess., U.N. Doc. C 89/24
(1989) [hereinafter Agreed Interpretation].
260

Proponents of farmers' rights, including Mexico, India and Ethiopia, argued that varieties
found in the third world were often not mere accidents of nature but had been improved by tribesmen or fanning communities. For generations, they argue, farmers have
selected, bred and conserved plant species, including coffee, wheat, corn and cotton, and
continue to do this without fitting into a system of laboratories and patents.
Marlise Simons, Poor Nations Seeking Rewards for Contributions to Plant Species, N.Y.
TIams, May 16, 1989, at C4.
2' See Rose, supra note 237, at 155.
22 Agreed Interpretation, supra note 259.
See United Nations Conference Resolution 3/91 (1991) [hereinafter Third Annex].
"4
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 603.
Id. (emphasis added).
6
See id. at 604-05.
27 See id. at 605.

414

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 30:373

VIII. THE BIODVERSITY CONVENTION
A. The Scope of the Biodiversity Convention
The 1992 UNCED, commonly referred to as the "Earth Summit,"
was perhaps the most publicized international environmental event since
the Stockholm Conference twenty years earlier. The dominant news item
at the event, unfortunately, was the U.S. refusal to sign the Biodiversity
Convention. At the behest of its powerful biotech industry, the United
States declined to join the 157 other nations that endorsed the treaty in
Rio de Janeiro.'
As noted previously, one of the three stated objectives found in
Article 1 of the Biodiversity Convention is "the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources." This
objective is similar in spirit to that stated in the 1983 International
Undertaking. In contrast with the original Undertaking, however, the
Biodiversity Convention attempts to serve that objective through affirming
individual ownership of genetic formulas.
The Biodiversity Convention attempts much broader coverage than
does the International Undertaking. While the Undertaking sets standards
for the use and conservation of agricultural plants, the Convention
concerns itself with the whole of biodiversity. Quipped one expert,
"the Convention on Biological Diversity . . . is much less a convention
on biodiversity than a convention on access to genetic resources."'
Unlike the International Undertaking, the Biodiversity Convention
does not specifically mention elite commercial varieties. The Convention,
however, asserts the right of all parties to share in the benefits after utilization of such resources.2' This implies that even if the term "genetic
resource" is confined to unimproved "raw materials," the collective rights
of humanity
are not limited once those raw materials enter the laborato73
ry.

Z

s See id. at 619.

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
A large portion of the Convention, however, focuses on those same issues tackled
by the Undertaking. It may be questioned whether any additional ground was covered
in Rio.
2o

2' Barton, supra note 231, at 146.
27 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.

Biotech companies might interpret this clause to mean "we make a socially-desired product, you get to buy it and use it; everyone benefits." Developing countries
probably have more of a profit-sharing in mind.
2
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B. The Demise of the Common Heritage Principle
It was evident well before UNCED that the common heritage
principle in relation to genetic resources was losing stature. The Third
Annex to the Undertaking had subjected the principle to the overriding
sovereign rights of source countriesY That same year, UNEP and several dozen other governmental and non-governmental organizations sponsored the "Nairobi Expert's Workshop on Property Rights, Biotechnology,
The workshop's panel of experts, broadly
and Genetic Resources."'
the
debate, concluded that the treatment of
drawn from all parties to
biodiversity and genetic resources as common heritage was detrimental to
conservation efforts and efforts to resolve inequities in the then-current
systemY6
C. Article 15: State Sovereignty Over Genetic Resources
Given the direction taken immediately prior to UNCED, it is not
surprising that the Biodiversity Convention reasserts state sovereignty. The
Convention, however, goes one step farther and consciously avoids
restatement of the common heritage principle.'m In the Preamble,
biodiversity conservation is referred to as a "common concern of humankind." 8 The phrase was deliberately substituted to dilute the collective
ownership implied by the term "common heritage."
Article 15 addresses the issue of the sovereign rights of source countries. Paragraph 1 of the Article states: "Recognizing the sovereign rights
of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access to
genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to
national legislation."' Paragraph 5 adds: "Access to genetic resources
shall be subject to the prior informed consent of the Contracting Party
providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by the party."'
Paragraph 1 of Article 15 is the cornerstone of the Biodiversity
Convention's treatment of PGR. It establishes the source country as

' See Michelle Thorn, International Policy on Plant Genetic Resources, INsTrruTE
FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE PoLicy, May 1995.
'7 See African Center Hosts Expert Workshop on Property Rights, Biotechnology and
Genetic Resources, DIVERsrrY, vol. 7, no. 3 (1991), at 10.
26 See id.
21 See Maria Clara Maffei, Evolving Trends in the International Protection of
Species, 36 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 131, 163 (1993).
27 Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added).
27 See Maffei, supra note 277, at 163.
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(1) (emphasis added).
I' art. 15(5) (emphasis added).
Id.
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controlling authority over its own genetic resources. Paragraph 5 emphasizes that authority by mandating than no collector may remove genetic
resources without first seeking permission from the state. Plant collectors
no longer have the free and open access enjoyed under a "common
heritage" regime.
Paragraph 2 of Article 15 places a check on the state's authority.
Parties "shall endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic
resources ... " and may not "impose restrictions which run counter to
the objectives of this Convention."' 2 This passage provides a check on
both intellectual property restrictions and on PGR access restrictions.
Nonetheless, the clear intent of Article 15 is to establish that the
source country is owner and provider, and to place most of the cards in
the hands of that country. Paragraph 2 might create vague obligations to
negotiate terms of access in good faith, but the source country is still the
arbiter as to what constitutes reasonable terms, and whether access will
ultimately be granted." This provision grants developing countries a
basis in international law to require compensation for their PGR.'
D. Article 19: Biotechnology and the Distribution of Benefits
Article 19, Paragraph 1 obligates the contracting parties to "take
legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate,to provide
for the effective participation in biotechnological research activities by
those Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, which provide
the genetic resources for such research, and where feasible in such
Contracting Parties." Though this article pointedly acknowledges the
contribution of developing countries to biotechnology research, its "where
feasible" and "as appropriate" language just as pointedly waters down
obligations to bring these countries aboard on research projects.
Paragraph 2 provides: "Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote and advance priority access on a fair and
equitable basis by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to
the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic
resources provided by those Contracting Parties. Such access shall be on
mutually agreed terms." ' 6
The more precise language of Paragraph 2 creates an obligation to
include developing nations in biotechnologically induced gains. What is
IId. art. 15(2).
See Maffei, supra note 277, at 165-166.
See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 621.

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 19(1) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 19(2).
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not clearly spelled out, however, is whether the term "benefits" includes
a share of the financial rewards or just priority access to the finished
products of biotechnology2' Also, questions remain as to whether a
share of the rewards go directly to the country of origin or whether
biotechnologically advanced nations must provide products at a favorable
price, train source country personnel in use of such products, or donate
a portion of the profits to international funds.
E. Article 16: Technology Transfer

By far the most contentious portions of the Biodiversity Convention
are the provisions relating to technology transfer. This subject was the
main sticking point cited by the United States in its reasons for refusing
to sign the Convention at Rio." Article 16 deals with technology transfer in relation to genetic resources as follows:
1. Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes biotechnology, and that both access to and transfer of technology among
Contracting Parties are essential elements for the attainment of the
objectives of this Convention, undertakes subject to the provisions of this

Article to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other
Contracting Parties of technologies that .. .make use of genetic re-

sources ....
2. Access to and transfer of technology referred to in paragraph 1 above
to developing countries shall be provided and/or facilitated under fair
and most favorable terms, including on concessional and preferential
terms where mutually agreed .... In the case of technology subject to
patent and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer
shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights ....

3. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in
particular those that are developing countries, which provide genetic
resources are provided access to and transfer of technology which makes
use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms, including technology
protected by patents and other intellectual property rights ....

At least one prior proclamation on the subject lends support to the notion that
direct sharing of financial rewards are anticipated. The Bruntland Report, adopted by
the United Nations five years earlier, stated that "[d]eveloping countries must be
ensured an equitable share of the economic profit from the use of genes for commercial purposes.' Maffei, supra note 277, at 171 n.159.
' See Steve Usdin, Biotech Industry Played Key Role in U.S. Refusal to Sign
BioConvention, DIvERsrrY, vol. 8, no. 2 (1992), at 8.
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4. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate,with the aim that the private sector facilitates
access to, joint development and transfer of technology referred to in
paragraph 1 above for the benefit of both government institutions and
the private sector of developing countries and in this regard shall abide
by the obligations included in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.
5. The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this
Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive
of and do not run counter to its objectives.'
U.S. biotechnology leaders looked past the deference Paragraph 2
gave to existing intellectual property schemes and expressed fear that
Article 16 would rob them of their property rights. The Chief Executive
of one company, in a letter to President Bush, stated, "[tihe vague language relating to 'technology transfer' and equitable sharing appear to be
code words for compulsory licensing and other forms of property expropriation."' g Others, some from within the biotech industry, felt this
threat to be insubstantial and argued that the treaty was merely a framework through which the parties could negotiate mutually satisfactory
terms of transfer.29' The U.S. official delegation played an important
role reworking Article 16 to include the protective language of Paragraph
2 and elsewhere. 2 Nevertheless, they remained harshly critical of the
article as a whole and refused to endorse it.293

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 16 (emphasis added).
U.S. Biotech Companies Leery of Biodiversity Treaty, SAN FRAN. EXAM., June
11, 1992, at 13A (quoting Kirk Raab, CEO of Genentech Inc.).
"' See R. Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora'sBox or Fair Deal? Convention
on Biological Diversity, 256 SCIENCE 1624 (1992); see also Administration Objections
to Treaty Based on Misreading of Text, Study Says, BNA WASH. INSIDER, Nov. 3,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
See Rose, supra note 237, at 149.
2 The U.S. delegation stated that "[iln regard to Article 16, this delegation finds
Article 16
it potentially deficient in the protection of intellectual property rights ....
fails to recognize the positive role of intellectual property systems in facilitating
technology transfer and cooperative research and development by private entities.'
Maffei, supra note 277, at 170 (reprinting the Annex to the Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity on the Work of
its Seventh Negotiating Sessioni Fifth Session of INC, May 27, 1992, Doec. UNEP/
Bio.Div./N7-INC.5/4).
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F. Evaluation of the Biotech Industry's Opposition
Industry fears concerning the language of Article 16 are not surprising. Industry craves precise delineations of rights, while the Biodiversity
Convention highlights uncertainty. In an attempt to pacify both Northern
and Southern interests, Article 16 forcefully calls for technology transfer,
hedges through application of "as appropriate" language, and then states
that no transfers are allowed that would run counter to intellectual
property schemes. Intellectual property schemes, however, do not allow
for much transfer at all unless the holder of the intellectual property right
is paid in full for the use of its technology. The point of the South
calling for transfer on preferential terms is to reduce the compensation
requirement. The South wants the technology and the North wants the
South to have it. But while the South sees itself as potential partner, the
North looks south and sees only paying customers. Article 16 achieves
closure (or at least circularity) in Paragraph 5 by asserting that the
intellectual property schemes themselves should be reworked so as not to
interfere with the goals of the treaty (which are not to be implemented so
as to interfere with intellectual property rights, and so on...)f24
Based on this lack of clarity, industry opposition to the treaty in
defense of its own interests is, arguably, a perfectly rational business
decision.f 5 Further, the biotech industry plays an important role in the
2

That the delegates settled for this muddled language is perhaps just as un-

derstandable as the industry's hesitation. As with many negotiations, the delegates were
trying to create a bridge between positions that were poles apart. The earnest desire to
bring everyone on board, however, went unfulfilled when the primary biotech nation
decided to sail on its own.
Neil Hamilton aptly summarized the biotechnology industry position as:
2
The concerns of the American biotechnology industry are understandable when viewed
from a business perspective. First, the financial investment companies have made in
genetic engineering, plant breeding, and other biotechnologies and the fact that many of
those investments are just now reaching commercial viability create a natural concern
about sharing the technology on "concessional and preferential terms" with developing
countries. Second, business relations are usually premised on exact language with
understood interpretationsand protections, making industry skeptical of the vague and
undefined language employed in international treaties of this nature. Third, the uncertainty over future interpretations is of special concern to the biotechnology industry
because of the U.S.'s reliance on developing a strong system of IPR protections for
biotechnology. The uncertain and potentially contradictory positions of the Treaty in
reconciling protections for IPR with the concepts of technology transfer and financing
of biodiversity conservation efforts creates too much uncertainty for some observers.
Hamilton, supra note 5, at 623 (emphasis added). This is not to say that these
concerns necessarily cancel out all other factors, factors that might have influenced the
United States to support the Biodiversity Convention. Professor Hamilton merely
provides insight into the understandable trepidation of the industry with regard to ill-
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U.S. economy, and is projected to play a much bigger role in the future. A certain amount of deference is therefore warranted. The common pro-business argument is that a nation must support its industry, lest
that industry flee to other, more hospitable jurisdictions. Signing an
international law that runs counter to a particular industry's interest might
certainly be perceived as lack of support. The argument is somewhat less
convincing, though, when every other jurisdiction has already endorsed
the offending law. In the present case, from whom could the beleaguered
industry seek refuge?
At any rate, it is never absolutely necessary for industry self-interest
to completely dominate a country's stance during negotiations of an
international environmental treaty. Other reasonable considerations, such
as equity, or a broader, more farsighted look at environmental impact,
might weigh in the equation.2' At UNCED, the United States apparently
decided that no difference existed between its own interests and those of
its biotech industry. This position left little room for concession given the
dominant view from the biotech industry that no treaty was preferable to
a treaty not strictly on industry terms.298 The experience at Rio is applicable to most global environmental treaties. Once a country charts its
negotiating course based on excessive deference to a particular industry,
it will find that it cannot easily maneuver into the mainstream.2 9
When President Clinton took office the year following UNCED, he
reversed the U.S. position and signed the Biodiversity Convention, accom-

defined regulations.
296

Biotechnology is one of the fastest growing industries in the world, and this growth is
expected to continue accelerating in the near future. Between 1985 and 1990, the
number of biotechnology patent applications filed in the United States grew by fifteen
percent annually. Total product sales for the US biotechnology industry in 1991 totaled
approximately $4 billion, a thirty-eight percent increase over 1990, and by the year
2000 sales are expected to grow tenfold to approximately $50 billion annually.

Bosselmann, supra note 159, at 115.
' This is not to assert that industry concerns necessarily always run counter to concerns for equity and the environment. The manner in which developing nations should
be compensated has not been established. The relationship between biotechnology and
biodiversity is complex. Nevertheless, the U.S. stance at Rio was notable in its singular
focus on protecting its turf.
29 See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 11314.
' Such a country might, in fact, find its solitary boat stuck at the "banks" unable

at first to escape the mire and to follow all the other boats charting a new course
down the river, unable later to replenish its genetic depositories, and ultimately,
perhaps, unable to keep financial institutions dependant upon an isolated industry afloat.
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panied by a letter of interpretation asserting industry rights." Attempts
to ratify the treaty stalled in Congress, however, and the United States is
unlikely to become a party to the Biodiversity Convention anytime soon.
IX. IN THE WAKE OF

UNCED: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY TO FULFILL

THE MANDATE OF THE BIoDIvERsrrY CONVENTION

A. Preservationof AgriculturalDiversity
1. Revising the International Undertaking
The Biodiversity Convention represents a dramatic shift from the
philosophical position staked out in the original 1983 International
Undertaking2 °' The 1983 Undertaking itself altered the traditional principle of common heritage by extending its reach to elite varieties. But 1983
and 1992 represent opposite ends of the spectrum. The 1983 Undertaking,
to promote conservation and the sharing of benefits, forcefully repudiated
proprietary restrictions over specific genetic codes. The Convention,
promoting the same goals, embraced such proprietary restrictions.
The Biodiversity Convention was not, however, a substantial leap
from the International Undertaking as it existed immediately prior to
UNCED. The 1989 Agreed Interpretation acquiesced to the notion of
"Breeder's Rights,"
and the 1991 Third Annex had subordinated
"common heritage" to "national sovereignty."' The Convention merely
eliminated the concept of common heritage while elevating individual
ownership through intellectual property schemes and national sovereignty.
Any differences still remaining between the Convention and the
Undertaking may soon be eliminated. Agenda 21, the 800-page sustain-

'4 See Scalise & Nugent, InternationalIntellectual Property, supra note 165, at 112.
The letter of interpretation (to be included with ratification) affirms a company's exclusive rights to its own technology. The letter further maintains the U.S. position that the

treaty is not retroactive, that technology transfers must be voluntary, and that no compulsory licensing will be allowed. See id.
The international community has taken a dim view of President Clinton's letter of
interpretation, accusing the United States of attempting to obtain unilaterally what it
could not achieve through negotiation. The United States, on the other hand, has encouraged other developed nations to file similar letters. See id. at 113. Whatever the
legal implications of one nation's attempts to attach "interpretation letter riders" to
international treaties, the question is somewhat moot while both the treaty and the letter
gather dust in Congress.
"' See Neil A. Belson, The Biodiversity Convention and the Private Sector, DIvERSITY, vol. 12, no. 1 (1996), at 6.
See Agreed Interpretation, supra note 259.
See Thom, supra note 274.
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able development policy resolution adopted at UNCED,"' called for a
fourth revision of the Undertaking for the express purpose of bringing it
in line with the Convention. 5 The following year, the FAO officially
resolved to begin work on such a revision.' Work is to proceed in
three stages. The first will incorporate the annexes into the main body
and will harmonize the Undertaking with the Biodiversity Convention.
The second will deal with promoting "Farmers' Rights," a commitment to
compensating developing world farmers and to assist them in their "in
situ" conservation efforts. In the third stage, the Undertaking might even
be drawn into the Biodiversity Convention's official framework, as a
legally binding protocol to the Convention.'
2. Defining the Legal Status of IARC Collections
A major gap in the Biodiversity Convention is its silence concerning
the legal status of the IARC reserves collected prior to the Convention."3 The omission is glaring in that these vast reserves represent over
one-third of the unduplicated samples of the world's germplasm,309 and
are a major portion of debate between North and South over access and
sharing of PGR benefits."' A recent agreement between the CGIAR and
the FAO, by which the FAO takes over control of the CGLAR's IARC
gene banks, may help to close this gap left open by the Biodiversity
Convention.'3
The FAO, through establishment of the Commission on Plant Genetic
Resources and enactment of the Undertaking, envisioned a global, coordi-

' See James 0. Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating ProprietaryRights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 159-60 (1994).
o See Spirit of Cooperation Overshadows Disharmonies as FAO Commission Marks
10th Anniversary, DIvERsrrY, vol. 9, nos. 1&2 (1993), at 4 [hereinafter Spirit of
Cooperation].
306 REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING, FAO Conference Resolution
7/93, Nov. 1993.
See Thorn, supra note 274.
See Spirit of Cooperation, supra note 305; see also IBPGR Director Hawtin Encouraged by BioConvention, But Uncertainties Remain, DIVRSrrY, vol. 8, no. 2 (1992),
at 5.
' See Wolfgang Seibeck & John Barton, The Implications of Applying the Legal
Concept of Trust to Germplasm Collections in the CGIAR Research Centers, DIVERSrrY,
vol. 8, no. 3 (1992), at 29.
310 See Consultative Group Signs Landmark Agreement to Place CGIAR Genebanks
Under FAO Trusteeship, DIvEasrry, vol. 10, no. 4 (1994), at 4 [hereinafter Consultative
Group].
31 See id.
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nated system of national, regional, and international gene banks.3 ' 2 Absent participation and funding from the developed world during the Seed
Wars of the 1980s, of course, there was little chance that this global system would reach substantial size.
National and "international" systems did, however, continue to
function as they had prior to the Undertaking, the most extensive being
that operated by the IARCs under the direction of the CGIAR. The
CGIAR gene banks, housed in twelve of the sixteen LARCs, hold what is
perhaps the world's largest collection of unique samples. 3 Developing
nations have sometimes questioned the impartiality of the CGIAR.314
The organization has been vilified at times as an agent of the North,
using the IARCs to facilitate the uncompensated transfer of Southern
resources to Northern laboratories.1 ' Whether this view represents fact,
rhetoric, or a bit of both, the question over who actually controls the
IARC germplasm collections has never been settled. Their status remains
in question despite the Undertaking and the Biodiversity Convention.
One difficulty has been the uneven legal status of the IARCs themselves. The research centers were not established through any sort of
encompassing international "grand opening," but evolved separately and
under varied legal arrangements with the host countries.3"6 Though the
CGIAR came to act as the international director and coordinator of this
system, 31many
of the centers operate under charters that pre-date the
7
CGLAxR.
The CGIAR itself adhered to the principle of common heritage and
free and open access. The CGIAR maintained that the LARC collections
were held "in trust," with all of humanity the beneficiary.1 8 Some of
the IARCs, however, held a more independent view. A 1991 survey by
the IBPGR revealed that all but one of the centers assumed that their
collections were part of the centers' assets, assets that would be retained
by the host country in the event of dissolution.319
A study conducted by the FAO in 1986 concluded that the CGIAR
gene banks existed in a unique world between national and international
311
13

See International Understanding,supra note 2, art. 7.
See Seibeck & Barton, supra note 309, at 31. The total number of samples,

counting duplicates, is estimated at over 500,000. See Brown, supra note 154, at 5, 6.
314 See Consultative Group, supra note 310, at 5.
3,1 See Rose, supra note 237, at 159.
326 See Seibeck & Barton, supra note 309, at 30.
317 See id.
328 See id. at 32. According to Seibeek and Barton, "the CGIAR almost certainly"

uses the concept of trust "in a relatively non-technical way." See id.
319

See id.
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law: "[T]hey are not created by a formal treaty concluded among States
or other international legal persons, and their activities are not directed by
States or such other international legal persons ... ."' Though the
centers are usually incorporated and operate under the laws of the host
state, policy is directed by both national and international representatives
" ' The Report concluded
sitting on the Boards of Trustees.32
that "the
genebanks maintained by the IARCs are neither under the control of any
given State or national authority, nor in the private sector. Their status is,
in fact, sui generis ....,322
3. FAO/CGIAR Agreement
Debate over the status of the IARC collections was put to rest in
October of 1994, when the CGIAR agreed to place the collections under
the trusteeship of the FAO.3" By the terms of the agreement, FAO
operates the network of gene banks within the framework of the International Undertaking, a solution that received broad consensus approval.324
CGIAR Chairman Ismail Serageldin pointed out that "CGIAR brings one
third of the world's germplasm to FAO's Global System," a move which
has the practical effect of finally launching the system eleven years after
it was conceived."
The FAO/CGIAR agreement helps resolve the fate of hundreds of
thousands of seeds currently in storage. It brings these collections within
the framework of the International Undertaking, which in turn could be
incorporated into the Biodiversity Convention framework. Though some
form of compensation is now likely, the precise structure remains in
question. The question is especially difficult for many samples, collected
under an assumption of common heritage, and for which lineage is uncertain." The FAO has suggested that if the country of origin is unknown,
"compensation might be provided to developing countries collective7
ly.1

32

32 Seibeck & Barton, supra note 309, at 31 (reprinting Legal Status of Base and
Active Collections of Plant Genetic Resource (CPGR/87/5)).
321See id.
322Id.
31

See Consultative Group, supra note 310, at 4.

324

See id.

32

Id. at 5.

326 See REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING, ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
IN STAGE II: AccEss TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, AND FARMERS' RIGHTS, CPGR-

Exl/94/5, COMMISSION ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES, First Extraordinary Session
Rome, Nov. 7-11, 1994.
32

Id.
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Compensation structure was a topic at the Sixth session of the
Commission on Plant Genetic Resources of the FAO held in Rome in
June 1995."2 The FAO Commission received a report at the meeting
from the IPGRI outlining the possible compensation structure to govern
germplasm exchange through the IARCs and other Global System banks.
The IPGRI report proposed a multilateral framework that maintains
the principle of open access but preserves the ownership rights of source
countries.'" A source country would place its germplasm in the bank,
and others would have unrestricted access to the resources with no initial
payment. But as a condition to receipt of the germplasm, users would
have to sign a material transfer agreement (MTA) which recognizes the
source country's continued financial interest in the germplasm 3 ° If
commercial profit results from the use of these materials, the user is
obliged to negotiate a share of the profits with the source country.3"
Regarding materials collected and stored prior to the Convention, the
report suggested either continuing access under the common heritage
principle or funneling a share of any profits from such materials into an
international fund for the implementation of Farmers' Rights.332
At least two of the IARCs, the International Center for Tropical
Agriculture (CIAT) and the International Center for the Improvement of
Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT), already use MTAs to handle transfers of
8 See Commission Debates FAO Undertaking Revision as 4th ITC Approaches,
DIvERsrrY, vol. 11, no. 3 (1995), at 4.

32 See id.
' In a paper prepared for the IPGRI prior to the Sixth Session of the Commission

on PGR, Barton and Seibeck explain:
MTAs are a recent phenomenon, used in connection with the transfer of biological
materials with potential commercial significance. They can be used for transfer of
material for curation (e.g. storage in genebanks), for research, or for commercial use .
... As agreements, they may take a variety of forms - from letter statements
accompanying a shipment of materials to detailed and formally negotiated contracts
signed by both parties before a transfer is made ....
MTAs are generally subject to trade secret law. In those countries that protect trade
secret contract, MTAs offer a form of intellectual property protection that can go beyond that available under patent law. An MTA, for example, can cover material that is
not patentable; it can (at least as a matter of law) be effective for longer than the
typical patent term. At the same time, it is ineffective against independent development
of similar material, and an MTA may lose legal force once the material involved
becomes significantly disseminated, whether voluntarily or not.
John H. Barton & Wolfgang E. Seibeck, Material Transfer Agreements for the InternationalAgricultural Research Centers?, (Paper Presented for the International Plant
Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), Final Draft, March 11, 1994).
" See Commission Debates, supra note 328, at 4.
332

See id.
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genetic materials. 333 The CIAT MTAs provide that users must inform
the research center of any intended use, and may not protect a variety
derived from CIAT materials outside the country of origin.3" Under a
more general plan for Global System gene banks, these conditions could
change. This severe restriction might be loosened on developing protected
varieties from CIAT-processed materials, but presumably only under a
strengthened regime compensating the source country.
4. In Situ Preservation
Resolving the fate of genetic resources tucked away in gene banks
is only one step toward implementation of the Biodiversity Convention.
The Convention, in fact, makes it clear that such ex situ measures are
important, but should be considered a secondary method of conserving
genetic resources. The treaty emphasizes instead in situ preservation. 3"
In situ preservation, though, is a more difficult task. Ex situ preservation
involves a race to collect and store the resources before they are lost. In
situ preservation strikes closer to the root of the problem; it seeks to turn
back the forces leading to the loss of the resources. In the case of
agriculture, the battle is on two fronts: Conservationists must fend off
conversion to non-agricultural uses, and must fend off agricultural uses
that are detrimental to diversity. To do both, developing world farmers
must be paid to continue farming, but not to succumb to the temptation
of high-yield varieties.
Creating an international fund to support farmers in these conservation efforts (a central goal for advocates of Farmers' Rights) was a
contentious topic at the June 1996 Fourth Technical Conference on Plant

3 See First Post-NAFTA and UPOV Findings on Plant Breeders' Rights Released,
University of Amsterdam Report Shows Minimal Impact on Germplasm Exchange,
DIVERsITY, vol. 12, no. 1 (1996), at 10.
334 See id. at 10.
" The tenth paragraph of the Convention's Preamble states that "the fundamental
requirement for the conservation of biological diversity is the in situ conservation of
ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations
of species in their natural surroundings." The Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, at
pmbl. (emphasis added). The next paragraph adds "ex situ measures, preferably in the
country of origin, also have an important role to play." Id. The wording and comparative length of these two provisions, and the order in which they were placed in the
preamble, show an unmistakable order of preference. The preference is further emphasized by the greater detail devoted to Article 8, (in situ), compared to that of Article
9, (ex situ), and by the opening paragraph of Article 9, which states that ex situ
conservation should be undertaken "predominately for the purpose of complementing in

situ measures." Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
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Genetic Resources.3" The FAO-sponsored Conference, held in Leipzig,
Germany, was described as "the largest intergovernmental conference in

history" devoted to "the conservation and better use of plant genetic
'
resources for food and agriculture."337
In preparation for the Conference,
154 governments submitted Country Reports to FAQ, assessing the status

of plant genetic resource conservation, use, and needs within their respec-

tive countries. 338 From these Country Reports, FAQ prepared its Report

on the State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources. 39 Using this encompassing global report as a guide, the delegates from 150 countries met
in Leipzig to agree upon the Global Plan of Action (GPA), a specific
plan to protect agricultural diversity and "enhance world food security"
within the framework of the Biodiversity Convention and the soon to be
revised Undertaking. 3" The GPA's twenty "priority activities" emphasize

on-farm conservation. 4

The big victory at the Conference was the grudging acknowledgement by the United States of Farmers' Rights. "The agreed text [of the
GPA] will commit the world community to recognizing the 'needs and
rights of farmers and farming communities to have access to the
germplasm, information, technologies, financial resources and research and
marketing systems necessary for them to continue to manage and improve

plant genetic resources."'

2

The U.S. delegation, with Canada's support,

sought to dilute the text by referring to Farmers' Rights as a "concept,"' 3 the better to study further rather than implement immediately.
When the developing countries dug in their heels, the United States

finally relented on the language.

' See Agriculture: Deadlock Over Who Pays for Plant Genetic Resources, Inter
Press Service, June 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Deadlock].
3 FAO, FAO News & Highlights. Action plan for plant genetic resources file.
3' See U.N. Warns of Erosion of Biodiversity, Loss of Genes, Japan Econ.
Newswire, Apr. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
...See id. The global report cites several examples of dramatic loss. Of the 10,000
wheat varieties used by China in 1949, only 1000 remained by the 1970s. In the past
century, the U.S. has lost 95% of its cabbage, 91% of its field maize, 94% of its pea,
and 81% of its tomato varieties. See Greg Tansey, Crop Defenders Gather in Leipzig,
FIN. Tudis (London), June 14, 1996, at 31.
' Biodiversity: Gov'ts OK Plan for Conserving Plant Genes, Greenwire, June 26,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Gov'ts OK].
341 Id.

' Dipankar De Sarkar, Agriculture: U.S. Bows to Farmers Rights on Biodiversity,
Inter Press Service, June 21, 1996, available in LFXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
See id.
See id.
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This achievement did not, however, result in any concrete provision
in the GPA concerning how these Farmers' Rights would be funded.
Without money, the argument over "concept" versus "reality" is a bit
moot, earnest language contained elsewhere in the document notwithstanding. Developing countries called for a promise of "new and additional funds" to be written into the plan. Developed countries preferred to
postpone the issue of how to pay for Farmers' Rights until the parties to
the Undertaking could meet in December 1996 to discuss possible revisions.' s The compromise reached at Leipzig has the GPA "underlin[ing]
the need for additional funds" without delving into specifics.' Following Leipzig, therefore, Farmers' Rights remained somewhat in limbo.
B. Preservationof Medicinal Plants
1. Pharmaceutical Bio-Prospecting
The primary focus of this Article has been on agricultural use of
plant genetic resources. As indicated above, progress is afoot toward
global consensus on preservation of and benefit-sharing for agricultural
diversity. The agricultural seeds that sprouted the initial conflict are not
the only source of "green" under discussion though. Dramatic profits of
a different nature are expected to arise out of places like the Brazilian
rainforest and the mountains of Kenya. From these uncultivated lands, the
genetic linchpin for the next miracle drug could be revealed.
Biotechnology, in a sense, has re-introduced the pharmaceutical
industry to some of these untamed places. Twentieth century chemists
have successfully synthesized the majority of drugs used in the developed
world, but faster screening methods have made wild plants (the historical
source of medicine and still the source for eighty percent of the developing world) more attractive.347 Chemists receive insight from these natural
combinations, finding nature to be more sophisticated than their computerenhanced imaginations."
Unlike agriculturalists, pharmaceutical companies have far less
interest in what is currently in storage than what is still unknown. 9
Like some plant breeders, pharmaceutical companies seek plants that show
unique characteristics. The purpose, however, is not to incorporate these
' See Gov'ts OK, supra note 340.
34

Id.

' See Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A
Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1678, 1679 (1995).
See id.
"Medicinal . . . species are rarely found in long-term public collections." FAO,
Plant genetic resources-biodiversity preserved file.

SAVING THE BLUEPRINTS

1998]

429

characteristics into other plants, but to incorporate them on a more
temporary basis into humans. Germplasm discovered in developing
countries has led to individual drugs worth millions, and profits for all
plant-derived drugs running into the billions.3" Source countries now
expect a share of these profits.
Despite U.S. recalcitrance and the industry's own continued wariness,
there are several examples of how U.S. pharmaceutical companies are
participating in the new order following UNCED. Perhaps it has dawned
on some U.S. companies that regardless of official abstention by their
home country, source countries fully intend to condition access on the
" ' By acceptbenefit-sharing mandated by the Biodiversity Convention.35
ing this reality, U.S. companies stave off hostile receptions in their
traditional hunting grounds. Innovative pioneers, who come to terms now,
will be able to enter negotiations in the spirit of voluntary cooperation,
good will, and importantly, good publicity 2
a. Merck/INBio Accord
A much publicized 1991 agreement between Costa Rica and U.S.
pharmaceutical giant, Merck & Company, serves as a model of how
source countries might receive a share of genetic resource profits. 3 The
agreement provided that Merck pay Costa Rica's Institutio Nacional de
Biodiversidad (INBio) one million dollars in exchange for approximately
10,000 plant, insect, and microbial soil samples. 4 In exchange, Merck
can patent any drugs developed from the samples, but is obliged to pay
INBio a royalty on profits realized from such drugs? 5 The amount of
the royalty has not been disclosed, but is rumored to be in the range of
one percent to three percent.35 6 Ten percent of INBio's initial one million dollar fee, and one-half of subsequent royalties, will in turn go to
Costa Rica's Ministry of Natural Resources.3" The rest is to be used
directly by INBio to fund conservation activities. 8
' See Kadidal, supra note 208, at 224.
3" See id. at 737.
352 See id. at 728.
3 See Elissa Blum, Making Biodiversity Conservation Profitable, ENvT., May 1993,

at 16.
3

See id. at 20.

3S

See id.
See id.

See id.
...See Karen Anne Goldman, Note, Compensation for the Use of Biological Resources under the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation
Measures and Competitiveness of the Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAw AND POL'Y INT'L
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A noteworthy aspect of the agreement is that the initial screening of
the samples took place not in Merck's labs but in Costa Rica, using
technology acquired from Merck.5 9 Merck provided INBio with
$135,000 worth of equipment to carry out the process of extracting the
desired chemical compounds.' Along with providing jobs in Costa
Rica, this arrangement provides a stronger connection between local
residents and the potentially profitable resource. 361' Despite no significant
leads in the first two years' worth of samples, Merck renewed its contract
with INBio.362
b. National Cancer Institute
Other U.S. pharmaceutical concerns are striking similar deals. The
National Cancer Institute (NCI)has been prospecting for anti-cancer drugs
since 1955.' 3 Recently, NCI agreed to begin compensating source countries for drugs developed from their resources. 3' NCI signed "Letters of
Collection"' with several countries (and one indigenous group from
Ecuador) obligating NCI to "make its best efforts" to provide royalties to
these countries.3 ' NCI obtains patents on drugs it develops, but actually
licenses its inventions to pharmaceutical companies, which then bring the
drugs to market. 67 In the future, NCI will require the pharmaceutical
companies to enter royalty agreements with source countries.
c. International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups
The formation of the International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups
(ICBGs) represents another attempt to comply in spirit with the

Bus. 695
...See
6 See
361 See
362 See

(1994).
Blum, supra note 353, at 20.
id. at 37.
id.at 38.
Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting:Fulfilling the

Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703, 728 (1995).
3
See id. at 719.
' See Fred Powledge, Who Owns Rice and Beans? Patents on Plant Germplasm,
BIoScmNCE, July 1995, at 440.
' These letters incorporated many of the terms of the Biodiversity Convention. See
Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 721-24.
w Id.
367See id. at 723.
' See id. In fact, "[tihere is no reason to assume that a developing country,
government, or institution will be able to bargain on equal footing with the licensee,
which is most likely a multinational pharmaceutical company." Id. at 724.
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Biodiversity Convention. Formed in 1994, the ICBGs are five bio-prospecting agreements involving U.S. universities, NGOs, pharmaceutical
companies, and developing world entities.3 Funded in part by the National Science Foundation, the National Institute for Health, and the
Agency for International Development, the agreements facilitate collection
activities to support both academic research and commercial drug developmentY0 The ICBGs are also meant to promote conservation and sustainable economic development in the developing world?"
Under the agreements, U.S. and source country organizations will
inventory and screen native plant species.' Some joint research is
involved.' Some aspects of these agreements mirror provisions of the
MerckllNBio accord: initial collection, extraction, and preliminary screening is conducted in the source countries.374 As with the Merck/INBio
agreement, pharmaceutical companies agree to pay royalties to source
countries, but royalty terms are not disclosed 75
2. Evaluation of the Agreements Involving U.S. Entities
These early efforts are promising signs. Nonetheless, some observers
note that the terms of the agreements still reflect the difference in bargaining power between Northern industry and Southern resource
providers.376 Some U.S. companies clearly want to keep the peace and
may honestly desire an equitable arrangement. But one gets the sense at
present that their magnanimity is fueled more by a desire for good
publicity than out of necessity. U.S. industry continues to stand in a
uniquely dual situation: they go hunting in Convention territory, but retire
with their spoils to the last bastion of common heritage 77
It is difficult to say whether U.S. cooperation in the Biodiversity
Convention would have any practical effect on access negotiations.
Merely entering the access agreements shows deference to some of the
Convention's principles. Of themselves, these agreements achieve partial

See
See
37, See
r See
m See
34 See
r

id. at 730.
id.
Goldman, supra note 358.
id.
id.

id.

3" See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 731.
36 See, e.g., id. at 725-36; Kadidal, supra note 208, at 234.
The United States has not officially accepted either the Undertaking or the
Convention. Prior to the Undertaking, of course, PGR was considered "common

heritage."

432

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 30:373

implementation. U.S. ratification would certainly not cause any immediate
boost in bargaining positions of the developing countries since the
disparity in bargaining power would still persist. Even if the treaty should
be transformed into U.S. law, the treaty's mandates are fairly nebulous.
It is not clear whether the United States would be obliged to coerce its
industry to do more than was already done in the examples given.
Arguably, though, U.S. industry retains an advantage by being
outside the treaty's framework. One industry chief has gone so far as to
say that the MercklINBio accord, which pre-dates the treaty, could only
have been possible in the absence of the Convention's "enormous slug of
mandatory contract language."378 Others within the industry disagree.'
"Mandatory contract language" would seem to be an overblown assessment regarding the dictates of any framework convention, not excepting
the Biodiversity Convention.
Regardless of U.S. government involvement, it does not appear for
the moment that developing countries possess sufficient leverage to force
U.S. industry into fulfilling all of the Convention's goals concerning
benefit sharing and technology transfer. Unable to fully invoke binding or
precise international law, and otherwise unable to bargain on equal
footing, developing countries hold the majority of the resources but do
not yet hold most of the cards.
The Merck/INBio agreement, the most visible of the agreements to
date, has been lauded in general principle but criticized in detail." The
adequacy of the royalty is questioned.38 ' Lack of accountability is a
concern for the Merck deal as well as for the others, given the standard
business practice not to disclose precise terms.3 And Merck's transfer
of technology, though it helps connect Costa Ricans to the resource, still
leaves them in the unfavorable roles of lab technicians, assisting Merck's
more exalted work.
It is understandable that Merck, the pioneer company in this area,
would be reluctant to create in Costa Rica a full partner and potential

' Blum, supra note 353, at 42 (quoting Richard Godown, president of the International Biotechnology Association).
3"

Id.

' See Kadidal, supra note 208, at 234-35; Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362,
at 725-30; Bosselmann, supra note 159, at 144; Blum, supra note 353, at 41.
"' See Kadidal, supra note 208, at 334 n.64 (stating that "typical royalty range for
undeveloped drug products is two to four percent"); Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note
362, at 725 n.112 ("Range known to be 1-5%"). These figures would place the
rumored Merck/INBio rate on the low side of the typical range. Even at the high end
of the range, the fee may not be sufficient to promote conservation. Id. at 729-30.
'
See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 725, 731.
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future competitor possessing its own resource base." The idea that
Costa Rica could be quickly and efficiently brought up to technological
speed, and could undertake the work performed in Merck's highly
specialized labs is unrealistic anyway."' The Biodiversity Convention,
though, contemplates a more elevated position for source countries in the
drug development process. It will be exceedingly difficult for even wellmeaning pharmaceutical companies and source countries to draw a
technology transfer line that is both feasible and satisfactory to both parties.3 "
If Costa Rica has in fact agreed to sell its resources too cheaply, 3"
this does not bode well for other developing countries. Most of them
cannot hope to best Costa Rica's bargaining efforts. Costa Rica represented an excellent locale for Merck to test the waters, but it is not altogether
representative of the developing world. It is one of the world's most
biologically-diverse countries, and faces many of the same economic
hardships faced by other developing countries." Costa Rica, however,
possesses many of the advantages enjoyed by nations that have long since
plowed under their biological resources. It has maintained a stable,
democratic government throughout the twentieth century."' It has a
phenomenally high adult literacy rate of ninety-eight percent. 89 It has a
fairly sophisticated business and scientific community, and perhaps due to
these factors, Costa Rica has long been committed to environmental protection."9 These conditions might buy for Costa Rica what other developing nations simply cannot afford: the time and inclination to wait, to
bypass immediate resource-depleting income to gamble on future, possibly
larger returns. Equitable or not, the Merck/INBio deal might have little
chance of surviving in most other developing countries.39'
One possible way to bring poorer, more desperate countries on board
is to juggle the compensation scheme. Poorer countries could enter deals
that provide for larger fees up front, with a corresponding decrease in the
royalty rate. Under this arrangement, benefits from their genetic resources
are more assured and more immediate. Economic conditions in these

See hi. at 728.
'" See William H. Lesser & Anatole F. Krattiger, The Complexities of Negotiating
Terms for Germplasm Collection, DiVERsrrY, vol. 10, no. 3 (1994), at 6,9.
.. See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 728.
3

31 See Blum, supra note 353, at 41.

See id. at 39-40.
' See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 729.

3

3" See Blum, supra note 353, at 39.
31 See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 729.
3 1 See id. at 729.
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countries cause them to discount future gains more heavily, so this
approach might even increase awareness and promote conservation more
effectively than the hope of future royalties.3"
There is, of course, a downside to this large initial payment. A larger
up-front payment shifts the risk to the pharmaceutical company. If
nothing of marketable value is discovered, the company will lose more
money. This shifting of the risk is exactly what developing countries
desire. Reduction of this risk, though, is itself a valuable commodity, and
one that pharmaceutical companies figure into their costs. It has been
suggested that an increase in the initial collection fee might, in balance,
result in lower overall gains for the source country."
The main concern of developing countries, however, is not whether
to emphasize initial payments or eventual royalties. The main goal is to
increase the size of the entire package, and to obtain more significant
transfers of technology. To do this, developing countries must, in effect,
reconstruct the marketplace.
C. Placing a Price Tag on Germplasm
The initial problem faced by developing countries is that they are
trying to sell something to a customer not convinced that the goods
possess financial worth. What source countries view as fair compensation,
industry views as subsidy. The traditional view of genetic resources is
that they are a common resource worthy of conservation perhaps, but not
of a price tag. Furthermore, prospectors only take "copies"; removing
them from the source country does not deplete the resource base itself.3" The traditional view of bio-prospecting might be analogized to
drawing water from a series of bottomless wells. Industry might grasp the
need to preserve a few of the wells, but cannot bring itself to pay much
for the water.
Northern industry has excused its failure to pay for genetic resources
by claiming that, in their unrefined state, they simply have no market
value.395 A particular sample may or may not lead to anything commer-

3 See Lesser & Krattiger, supra note 384, at 9,10.
3 See id. Of course, the risk does not just go away in a scheme offering higher
royalties and lower initial payments. It is transferred to the source countries. The suggestion, however, is that even with this factored in, the source countries are better off
if they can walt for royalties. See id. at 10.
a' See Kloppenburg & Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy, supra note 55, at 190.

3 To illustrate this traditional view, a passage from the Executive Summary distributed at a 1983 plant breeders' conference, sponsored by Pioneer Hi-Bred:
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cially useful. Even if a sample proves beneficial, it must be substantially
refined before it enters the market. Such resources might very well
become vital ingredients in products sold to millions, but the real work,
and hence the real value, is in putting the ingredients together. This view
is deeply rooted in the labor theory of property expressed by John
Northern industries exert labor upon the goods, "value" is
Locke:
added, and property rights are thus bestowed upon the laborers.
The labor theory of value creates an initial assumption that the value
of raw germplasm is extremely low relative to that of the final product.
By comparing the amount of work done to get from the raw germplasm
to the elite variety or to the drug, the value of the raw germplasm must
be calculated as a very small fraction of the total price. Zero to one
percent might seem fair. Two to three percent would certainly be considered generous.
In reference to land races, this form of calculating the relative value
errs by ignoring centuries of fine tuning performed by farmers. 3 The
toil of countless generations should not be so easily dismissed, even if it
was performed with no thought toward future commodity value. Yet even
this counterpoint relies on Locke's labor theory: land races are valuable
because farmers worked, and still work to create them. They are not mere
"products of nature," but instead are products of human labor.39 This is
a sound counter to the traditional view, but fails to represent the whole
of source country interests. If value is based solely upon the labor exerted
on the resource, then what compensation can source countries expect to
receive for that which is truly a product of nature, i.e., wild germplasm?
In reference to pharmaceutical bio-prospecting, what is the value of
samples taken from the uncultivated rainforest?
Some question the insurmountability of this problem. Perhaps the
developed world's failure to carve out a place for germplasm in the marketplace is better explained by citation to selfish motives than to the
writings of seventeenth century philosophers.3" Northern industry could

"[R]aw" germplasm only becomes valuable after considerable investment of time and
money, both in adapting exotic germplasm for use by applied plant breeders and in
incorporating the germplasm into varieties useful to farmers.

KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 185. The Executive Secretary of the IBPGR at the
time concurred in this viewpoint. Id.
3 See Odek, supra note 304, at 153 n.69.
a See id. at 154.

m See id.
a" "Market failure is an excuse rather than a logical justification for current practice.
It speaks of lack of will to make compensation; it is not a legitimate reason for failing
to do so." KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 187. Of course, Locke would not necessarily
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certainly be expected to hold whatever method of valuation best preserves
its own power and profit. Yet even among those who earnestly seek an
equitable solution, sincere bewilderment exists concerning how much raw
germplasm should cost.'
Increasing compensation to source countries does not hinge solely on
finding this mysterious value. At least one method exists that could
increase the level of compensation to source countries while remaining
true to Locke's principles: increase the amount of labor the source
country performs on the germplasm. The initial screening performed by
INBio before shipping the samples off to Merck is one, small example of
this. Even this solution has it limits, however. As discussed earlier,
technology transfer was one of the most bitterly contested issues at
UNCED.
If source countries possessed the requisite technology, they could
increase the amount of value they themselves add to their germplasm.
Industry, though, fears that a source country with too much technology is
a competitor with its own resources. The key from Northern industry's
perspective is to transfer just enough money and technology to satisfy the
source countries, inducing them to conserve, but not enough to erode
industry's own power base. Industry will voluntarily accept a low risk
transfer, such as Merck's donation of screening equipment to INBio, but
will continue to show caution in approaching the technology transfer line.
Whatever the greater good, Northern industry has no intention of instigating its own obsolescence." °
D. The Response from the South: Regional Accords
1. Genetic Cartels
The current market starts with the assumption that "unrefined"
resources have very little value. Source countries could increase compensation through bargaining for greater participation in the refinement
process, thereby adding recognizable value to their product. Northern
industry, however, cannot be expected to share significant amounts of
technology without significant amounts of pressure. Source countries do
not possess the means to exert individual pressure. Although the
Biodiversity Convention is a means of exerting collective pressure, it is
not concrete enough to force specific concessions.

disagree with the notion that selfish motives drive the process. He merely explains why
the outcome might be thought fair.
See Lesser & Krattiger, supra note 384, at 10.
4o' See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 728.
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Source countries may yet have the means to force greater technology
transfer and even to drive up the market price of their "raw" germplasm.
Through regional accords, source countries have a shot at accomplishing
what they could not hope for through individual leverage or through
naked invocation of the Biodiversity Convention. One example of this
collective action occurred immediately in the wake of UNCED. In June
1992, the nations of Central America, including Costa Rica, banded
together to sign a non-binding agreement on genetic resource use.
They agreed to coordinate national legislation and develop rules that
firmly condition
access to genetic resources on technology transfers and
40
training.
An even stronger statement of solidarity has been issued by the
nations of northwestern South America. Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador,
Peru, and Bolivia are parties to the Cartagena Agreement on Access to
Genetic Resources.' The Cartagena Agreement requires prospectors to
negotiate access agreements before they will be allowed into the region. Though access agreements will probably be negotiated on an
individual basis, the Cartagena Agreement provides guidance on royalties,
technology transfer, and research participation.' The Agreement also
provides for sanctions if the parties fail to comply with the terms.'
Penalties include expulsion, fines, cancellation of contracts, and refusal to
recognize intellectual property rights for materials developed in violation
of the Agreement. International law challenges to this specific, retaliatory rejection of IPR would seem disingenuous, given that the Cartagena
Agreement asks no more than the Biodiversity Convention requires.
These type of agreements increase source country leverage. In the
absence of such agreements, prospectors have the advantage. Any money
they offer is more than that particular country has ever received for its
resources. Other jurisdictions might harbor similar resources, and might be
willing to allow access for the same or lower prices. For the bio-prospector on a non-specific fishing expedition, it is a matter of who will take
the least amount of bait. If, on the other hand, the source countries form
a strong union, there would be in effect one source for the goods. Under
these conditions, the question for prospecting industries changes from

'

See Margulies, supra note 10, at 353.

See id.
4
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"Who will try hardest to attract my business?" to "How much am I
willing to pay?"
If these regional accords become widespread, prospectors will no
longer be able to shop around to find the government most desperate to
sell its resources for quick cash. The market effect could be significant.
If each country that possesses a particular type of resource agrees not to
bid against other such countries, a cartel of sorts would be formed.'
Similar types of source country cartels have worked before. Governments
in the developed world might have paid scant attention to the needs of
oil-producing nations, had such oil producers not banded together to form
OPEC. OPEC was able to wield a great deal of influence over the price
of oil during the 1970s." °
Even assuming genetic resource countries could display the extraordinary amount of unity needed to reduce the competition among
themselves,4 ' the battle is not won. Creating a cartel shifts the market
burden to the consumer countries, but it does not erase all the complexities of trying to price something that does not flow easily into that
market place. OPEC might be considered an apt role model, an example
of success, but the comparison between the two situations is very limited.
The subject matter in the present discussion is fundamentally different
than oil. Nonetheless, a comparison between the two sharpens the focus
on problems faced by genetic resource countries.
For one thing, OPEC restricts supply of a fairly uniform, known
resource. In contrast, genetic resource countries do not collectively hold
"one" definite resource. What genetic resource countries sell could be
compared to lottery tickets for a thousand different lotteries. One country
might supply the genetic answer to leukemia, another might harbor the
secret to keeping rice crops healthy. Prospectors would expect to find
regional similarities, but each country presents unique prospecting opportunities.
This uncertain and varied nature of the genetic product makes the
bond between genetic resource countries much more complex. Both
advantages and disadvantages can be predicted. Nations shopping for oil
could get the same product from a number of source countries; the better
to play one off the other and break the union."2 On the other hand,
'
410

See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 737-46.
Id.

41 Asebey and Kempenaar point out that this degree of unity may be unrealistic.
OPEC itself is cited as example in which the resource providers do not always speak
with one voice. See id. at 737-46. Still, even a fraction of the power OPEC wielded
in the 1970s would be impressive.
412 See id. at 745.
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oil's definite quality and quantity, a defined benefit from each barrel and
a sense that oil is non-replenishable, make it easier for OPEC to set a
price range.
Genetic resource countries do not peddle such a consumer-friendly
product. Not only do they sell "chances to win" on numerous jackpots,
they are unable to reveal the amount of any of the prizes. Past performance can serve as a rough guide in setting the initial, flat fee as in the
Merck/INBio deal. The royalty arrangement further alleviates the need to
determine beforehand the precise payoff.4 13 But not knowing the exact
amount of benefit that might flow from a particular handful of resources,
or even from the entire pool of resources, makes it difficult to speculate
on what is at stake with each royalty percentage point. Varied predictions
on how much money can be expected make it difficult for source countries to know what they have and what to ask for in return.
Between OPEC's product and that of genetic source countries, a
more salient difference than the compensation amount is the price tag
itself. Oil prices may fluctuate, but the tag has long been plainly visible
both to industry insiders and to end consumers. Every motorist in every
developed country is keenly aware of his or her own addiction to the
product. Television presents us with images of Middle Eastern men in
turbans, gathered around a table, discussing ways to drive up the price of
oil. The picture may have become heavily stereotyped, but it serves a
purpose. At least for one segment of the oil-producing nations, it says
clearly "We are here, at the other end of the fuel line. You must deal
with us."
Concern for biodiversity may be on the rise, but the consumer
relationship between genetic resource countries and the developed world
is not similarly imprinted on the psyche of the global public. Even if a
prescription drug is derived from a wild plant, it would be rare for the
patient to know the source of the healing chemical or even the name of
the chemical itself. Furthermore, prescription drugs are purchased sporadically. When they are purchased, the buyer is not in a "consumer mode."
There is minimal shopping around, and electing not to buy because of the
price is usually not an option. Often, insurance deadens the immediate
sting of the cost anyway.
One might expect more awareness when it comes to food products,
but the awareness does not extend very far down the line. Though the

"' It also admittedly strains the analogy. Lottery officials generally do not give
tickets away, asking only for a percentage back on the return. The initial flat fee,
however, preserves the element of chance.
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ASTA acknowledges its dependence on foreign germplasm,1 4 U.S.
farmers need not be aware of the battle waging between North and South
on this issue. The farmer must know only that his seeds come from
Pioneer Hi-Bred. The family at the grocer knows only that wheat grows
in places like Kansas. In neither case does the knowledge leapfrog to the
next provider in line. This is not undue ignorance. There just has never
been any practical reason for farmers and consumers to trace the source
further and learn the genetic lineage.41
It is obvious that source country solidarity, therefore, does not reduce
the inherent complexities in making products more marketable. Regional
agreements also do not cure the economic woes that plague developing
countries, and that sometimes steer the course of negotiations. But joining
together will at least afford the developed world the chance to develop a
uniform pricing scheme, and to present that scheme at the bargaining
table. This should make any given source country less fearful of being
undercut by a neighbor with similar resources, and less apt to merely
accept what industry decides, in fairness, it ought to pay. Developing
countries might also use these accords to assist each other in expanding
and solidifying enforcement mechanisms. This could help check resource
smuggling and increase the volume of international protests aimed at
prospecting companies that try to circumvent the rules.
2. Indigenous Rights
To complicate matters further, the compensation question does not
stop once the money or technology is handed over to the source country.
An issue not tackled in this Article, but relevant to the efficiency of the
compensation scheme is who receives the financial benefit within the
source country.416 Historically, the primary battle ground has involved
questions of equity and incentive between countries only. But it win not
be exclusively the national governments that will decide whether genetic
diversity is preserved. A quote by E.O. Wilson reminds us of what drives
the process:
The only way to make a conservation ethic work is to ground it in
ultimately selfish reasoning... an essential component of this formula
414

See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 7, at 186.

4" This discussion, of course, does not include finished (or near-finished) agricultural
products received directly from source countries. One of the best examples in which the
source country stands clearly in the limelight is gourmet coffee. The example is also
an ironic one for this discussion, given that the consumer product, the coffee bean, is
itself a seed.
416 See Odek, supra note 304, at 175-81.
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is the principle that people will conserve land and species fiercely if
7
they foresee a material gain for themselves, their kin, and their tribe."

Unfortunately, some conservation strategies may not be designed to
consider the interests of indigenous people.418

Of course, a government with a sufficient stake in the matter might
have the incentive not only to establish conservation measures but to
enforce them against interest groups within their jurisdiction. But some of
that stake will be lost in the enforcement. Conservation is much more
efficient if locals stand to benefit. The genetic resource issue in particular

does not conjure up images of countries so fat from compensation
received that they can afford to fend off an unwilling populace from the
resource preserves.

The Biodiversity Convention, in an effort to reach consensus, made
no attempt to tackle the issue of how local people will share in genetic
resource compensation. Brazil, in fact, made clear at UNCED its view
that such issues are a matter for the sovereign to decide.419 Concerning
the language of the Convention, Brazil fought even the appearance of
vesting property rights in its indigenous peoples.4' Brazil, for one, does

Walden, IntellectualProperty Rights and Biodiversity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DivERsrrY, supra note 237, at 171 (quoting
E.O. Wilson).
411See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 362, at 724. Absent participation and
support of indigenous peoples and other members of the local population, preservation
attempts are destined to fail. Columbia has an established national park system-much
of which is protected on paper only. Government officials estimate 20% of the
country's 2.2 million acres of park land are occupied by squatters and even by people
with illegal deeds to the properties. See Pamela Mercer, Columbia's National Parks Are
417 Ian

in a Losing Battle for Survival, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at C4. Such deeds are
obtained through corrupt local officials. See id.
419 See Walden, supra note 418, at 184.

successfully lobbied to change "common concern of peoples" in the Preamble to "common concern of humankind". The Brazil delegation felt the word
"peoples" might imply "indigenous peoples." Id. at 184. The Convention does recognize
indigenous people in another section of the document. Article 8 provides:
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, and as appropriate:
420 Brazil

(J)Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and
promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holder of such
knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits
arising from the utilisation of such knowledge, innovations and practices; ...
Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 8 (emphasis added).
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not intend for the benefits emanating from Rio to flow back to the
countryside until they are diverted through Brasilia.
X.

CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONs FOR THE FUTURE

The common heritage principle, as applied to genetic resources,
appears to be fading into insignificance. A commercial system is emerging in its place in which all germplasm collected for commercial purposes
is itself a commercial product. In the future, source countries will attempt
to regulate access to their resources, and will retain property rights in
them even after the germplasm leave the country. 1
If developing countries succeed, biological prospectors will be forced
to sign access agreements calling for initial fee collection, royalties on
commercial products developed from the resources collected, and some
technology transfers enabling source countries to participate in the refinement of such resources. Source countries will also retain property rights
to genetic resources passed to agricultural gene banks. Transfers in the
future will be accomplished through MTAs which will reserve source
country rights in the resources. These MTAs will provide that royalties
from commercial development flow back to source countries.2 2
Despite its shortcomings, the initial fanfare that greeted the
Merck/INBio agreement was probably justified. It marked the first widelypublicized model for how bio-prospecting industry and source countries
might implement the Biodiversity Convention. It also opened the door for
U.S. companies to participate in the new order, regardless of whether the
United States ever officially accepts the treaty.
The trend toward universal acceptance of the need to compensate
source countries does not answer the big question: how much? No
agreement exists regarding what genetic resources should or can cost, and
no one knows presently what benefits are to be expected from this new
promise of compensation. The Merck/INBio agreement is a start, but in
the long run it is not a model likely to satisfy source countries. Nor is it
likely to accomplish the goals of conservation in most developing countries. For now, unfortunately, there are more immediate and more definite
sources of income, though they deplete the resource base. Desperate
people in developing countries continue to plow under or pave over their
resources, and will continue to do so, until the market is up and running.
Short term necessities will prevail, even if the path is fairly clear for
greater, more sustained benefits in the future. It is not a matter of killing
the goose to get to the store of golden eggs inside. It involves instead

See Belson, supra note 301, at 6.
a See generally Barton, supra note 231.
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killing the goose for its meat because there is no immediate market for
the gold.
There is even little assurance that golden payoffs await those who
can afford to be patient. Traditional thinking does not equate genetic
resources with gold (or even "black gold," i.e. oil). Traditional thinking
places "raw" germplasm more in the realm of free-flowing water. If this
mindset proves insurmountable and makes it difficult to assign any real
market value to the resource, the developed world can at least concentrate
on paying not to have the wells developed over. The compensation
scheme, at minimum, must induce source countries not to develop the
land holding the resources. If the market fails to do so even after it is
influenced by regional genetic resource "cartels," then national governments must step in to fill in the compensation gaps.
An international fund to compensate genetic resource countries has
been suggested as an alternative to placing the burden on the biotech
industry.4' This route, should it prove necessary, will be difficult. Consumers reluctant to pay higher prices at the pump scream even louder
when asked to hand over the conservation tax directly. The public, and
the governments that represent them, do not seem to have the political
will in the late twentieth century to spend large sums of money on
conservation.424 Moreover, political will decreases the farther from home
conservation becomes, and the more it is burdened with the label of
"foreign aid." A scenario in which industry shoulders much of the initial
burden would be more effective, even if it means eventual higher costs
to end consumers.
The potential exists for biotechnology to facilitate preservation of
agricultural germplasm as well. Biotechnology facilitates incorporation of
both wild and cultivated germplasm into elite plant varieties. The hunt for
new samples thereby becomes more profitable for both seed and pharmaceutical companies. The Biodiversity Convention and the soon to be
revised International Undertaking provide a path toward the sharing of
agricultural profits. The relationship between biotechnology, agriculture,
and the environment, though, is very different than is the case with medicine. In agriculture, a central paradox remains that should keep the
relationship uneasy and should make conservation difficult, even in the
wake of UNCED.
The paradox was brought to light by the Green Revolution. The
Green Revolution, at the time of its inception, was regarded as a miraculous event. It provided high-yield crops that literally pulled large seg-
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See Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual Property, supra note 165, at 118.

"' See Deadlock, supra note 336.
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ments of the world population from the brink of starvation. However, it
did so at considerable expense to the environment and to the traditional
land races.
Biotechnology holds the promise of fixing some of the environmental
problems associated with high-yield varieties. Crops addicted to nitrogen
fertilizers and dangerous pesticides can and will be reinvented to grow in
other ways. This re-invention will be slowed by the overly close relationship between seed and chemical companies, but the change will take
place regardless. A desire to showcase more environmentally friendly
practices will induce at least a small trickle of research in the direction
of safer crops. Chemical companies might even accept the inevitability of
this change in the winds and decide to pursue it. Profit realized from the
new generation of super crops might even wean the chemical companies
themselves off the chemicals they currently depend upon to make profits.
However, a more fundamental and less easily resolved problem
regarding the relationship of high-yield varieties to the land races persists.
Seed company profit is achieved through widespread planting of elite
varieties. Widespread planting of elite varieties displaces land races.
However, if the conservation scheme for agricultural diversity imitates
that for medically valuable plants, land race conservation will depend
upon the profit realized from elite varieties. Under this scenario a catch22 exists where preservation of the land races is financed by the proliferation of the elite varieties that replace them.
The problem is inherent in the current market system. Seed companies cannot market diversity. To protect investment, the seed industry
must have intellectual property protections. To receive protection under
the current intellectual property system, seed companies must develop
uniform products, a task made easier through biotechnology. To financially gain from these uniform products, the seed industry must then pursue
the obvious strategy of mass production of products for a public willing
to buy them. Industry in the present case seeks to induce its customers to
plant the products far and wide, thereby displacing more diverse crops.
Perversely, therefore, the agricultural industry must follow the typical
formula for market success, it must do so by eroding the very pedestal
upon which its success is built.
In the past, agricultural industry has turned to seed banks to solve
this paradox. Seed banks can help by preserving large quantities of
germplasm long after the base is destroyed. Improved long-term storage
methods will make this more of a reality than it is now. At present,
shoddy conditions continue to ruin the samples in many banks. 4' But

' See Ramesh Jaura, Agricultural-NGOs:Leipzig Plan of Action a Mixed Bag, Inter
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even under the best of conditions, seed banks are a limited answer.42
Losing the base means losing untested genetic combinations that will
never be retrieved. No matter how impressive and well-preserved the
collections, it is naive to think the evolutionarily arrested samples in gene
banks can compensate for this loss. Building up these stores while
allowing the destruction of the ground from which they came may
preserve current bridges, but effectively incinerates those still under
construction.
The seed industry must find a new way to succeed in business. Seed
companies must engage in a delicate balancing act in which they promote
their products while intentionally limiting their spread. High-yield
cultivars must be planted in fields long since drained of their genetic
diversity. Land races and wild germplasm, however, must remain in place.
A cycle in which developing world farmers supply raw germplasm to
seed companies, who in turn supply high-yield varieties to those farmers'
fields, will only go around one rotation.
Seed companies must somehow be turned away, and developing
world farmers must be induced to stick with diverse, low-yield varieties.
It is doubtful that seed companies will accept this limitation voluntarily.
Already, concerned observers note the industry's "recent aggressive moves
The potential
toward the agricultural fields of developing countries."
for immediate profit tends to outweigh more diffuse concerns for future
generations, even for future generations of seed companies. The natural
temptation for the seed industry will be to continue unchecked market
expansion.
Developing world farmers are even less likely, and far less able, to
forego present profit for the good of humankind. Poor farmers can easily
be enticed away from uncertain chances at future royalties by the sure
income possible from planting elite varieties specially tailored for their
fields. The lure of high-yield profit is especially strong given that lowyield royalty prospects remain distant.4' An international fund would

Press Service, June 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
' Not everyone agrees with this conclusion. The eminently respected expert on
genetic resources, Sir Otto Frankel, expresses strong reservations concerning our ability
to foster in situ conservation of land races, and calls ex situ conservation "the only
reliable long-term conservation measure.' Frankel, Landraces, supra note 24, at 14, 15.
Frankel believes that, for agricultural purposes, our ex situ stores are nearly complete,
and the primary remaining task is "filling in the obvious and important gaps." See
Frankel, Genetic Resources, supra note 82, at 24.
42 Dipankar De Sarkar, Agriculture: Rich-Poor Clash Looms at FAO Conference, Inter Press Service, June 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
" Immediate royalties seem even less likely in agriculture than in medicine.
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seem absolutely necessary to support these fields of land races. Despite
the inherent problem of underfunding, this solution should be the focus
of international efforts if preservation is to succeed.
The world community attempted to come to grips with this urgent
need at the FAO conference in Leipzig, Germany. Results from the
Conference were mixed. Source countries came away from the Conference
with an acknowledgement that Farmers' Rights are more than mere
concept, but they did not go home with any money to make such rights
a reality. The fight to solidify the necessary financial commitment will be
taken up again when the International Undertaking is revisited, beginning
in December 1996.
Whether the countries of the world will muster the political will to
finance genetic resource conservation remains to be seen. Meanwhile, as
developed and developing worlds wrangle over genetic and financial
resources, the global population continues to increase dramatically.
According to estimates, in the year 2030, 8.7 billion people will try to do
what 5.7 billion are having difficulty doing today: farm enough land to
produce enough food while leaving enough diversity so the system does
not collapse.429 In the short term, food production will have to increase.
That increase will probably be realized through the planting of more
high-yield crops. The struggle will be to do so without polluting the
environment, eradicating land races, and cutting deeper into uncultivated
centers of diversity. The problem of population growth will eventually be
solved, of course, either through conscious human effort or by other
means. Nature has its own methods of correcting overload. The task at
hand is to insure that some of nature's more draconian methods will not
be employed.

Pharmaceutical bio-prospecting has at least a reasonable potential to find substances
with which to create whole new products, with new markets. With agriculture, most of
the tinkering in the near future will be done with what is already in storage. Land
races serve as more of the backup "insurance plan." Although the Biodiversity Convention and the International Undertaking contemplate compensation from use of these
stored genes as well, the expectation of compensation cannot be high. For resources
collected long ago and of uncertain pedigree, the outlook is for diffuse, watered down
compensation at best. This outlook would not likely excite farmers trying to make a
living.
429See Table Set Thinly as Food Summit Pledges to Halve World Hunger in 20
Years, U.N. CHRONICLE, Dec. 22, 1996, at 24.

